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I. INTRODUCTION

Placebos, by their very nature, should have no effect on a patient's
health. Nonetheless, there is a widespread belief that placebos can make
patients feel better, and even contribute to their cure. Physicians have long
been fascinated by the "placebo effect," which they steadfastly believe
exists, while not understanding how it works. Many physicians have such
confidence in placebos' therapeutic potential that they urge their use in
treating patients.' Howard Brody, a nationally recognized family practice
physician and bioethicist, recently published a book for patients entitled
PlaceboResponse: How You Can Release the Body's Inner Pharmacyfor
Better Health.2 Other placebo believers direct their advocacy toward
physicians, urging them to employ the power of the placebo; one scenario
imagines the placebo-prescribing physician explaining to her patient that he
is receiving a "new powerful medication without side effects that will help
reduce your pain."3
In response to this growing interest in the therapeutic potential of
placebos, the National Institute of Health hosted a gathering of scientists
from around the world in November 2000.4 Certain of the power of this
elusive phenomenon,5 these scientists articulated a research agenda geared
toward placebo treatment of patients.6
Stunningly, less than six months later, a study published in the New
England Journal of Medicine announced that the placebo effect does not
exist.7 The study's Danish authors suggested that the supposed placebo

1. Frederick J.Evans, Expectancy, TherapeuticInstructions,and the Placebo Response,
in PLACEBO: THEORY, RESEARCH AND MECHANISMS 215, 215 (L. White et al. eds., 1985).
2. HOWARD BRODY & DARALYN BRODY, THE PLACEBO RESPONSE: How You CAN RELEASE
THE BODY'S INNER PHARMACY FOR BETTER HEALTH (2000).
3. Id. at 225. In January 2001, the New York Times Magazine dedicated its cover story to
placebos. See Margaret Talbot, The PlaceboPrescription,N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 9, 200 1, at 34.
4. The Science ofthe Placebo: Toward an Interdisciplinary Research Agenda (Nov. 19-21,
2000) (conference program on file with author); see generallyChristine Wade et al., Conference
Report: The Science of the Placebo: Toward an Interdisciplinaryand Research Agenda,
November 2000, 7 J.ALT. COMPLEMENTARY MED. 383 (2001) (discussing the educational
objectives of the conference).
5. Robert Ader, True or False: The Placebo Effect as Seen in Drug Studies Is Definitive
Proofthat the Mind Can BringAbout ClinicallyRelevant Changes in the Body, 16 ADVANCES IN
MIND-BODY MED. 7, 10 (2000).
6. As explained by two of the presenters, "placebos work, yet we do not understand how
they work (their mechanism of action), to what degree they work (how much of the outcome
variance they account for), and under what circumstances they work (the ability to predict their
effect and to use that prediction in research and therapy)." Richard R. Bootzin & Opher Caspi,
Explanatory Mechanisms for Placebo Effects: Cognition, Personality, and Social Learning 2
(conference paper on file with author).
7. Asbjom Hrobjartsson & Peter C. Gotzsche, Is the Placebo Powerless?:An Analysis of
Clinical Trials ComparingPlacebowith No Treatment, 344 NEw ENG. J.MED. 1594 (2001); see
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effect detected in prior studies was likely attributable to poor research
methods, and otherwise could be explained upon closer examination.
The "placebo community" is unpersuaded by the Danish study, raising
questions about both the study and its conclusions.' One editorial
responding to it observed that the belief in the placebo effect is too strong
to be dispelled by one study which, the author opined, was overly broad in
its conclusions and left open too many questions.9
Discovering which of these conclusions is correct will have powerful
repercussions for the practice of medicine. If the placebo effect is real,
physicians must reconsider how they treat their patients. Most
fundamentally, physicians, ethicists and lawyers would have to reexamine
the prohibition against patient deception and the requirements ofinformed
consent. Placebo research suggests, for example, that pretreatment
emphasis on success improves positive outcomes.1" Second, placebos also
produce a negative, or "nocebo effect." Thus, it should be medically
contraindicated for physicians and pharmaceutical companies to disclose to
patients the potential adverse effects of a drug, lest they cause patients to
experience those side effects." Finally, using patient conditioning, but
without revealing the truth to patients, physicians could intersperse
placebos with analgesics, thereby allowing smaller doses of drugs to avoid
strong side effects, or to save money. These three novel treatment
scenarios, however, would require physicians to deceive (or at least conceal
information from) their patients.
New insights about the placebo effect should also cause us to rethink
the physician-patient relationship at the end of life. If, as researchers
suggest, patients are more likely to experience what they are led to expect,
the legions of physicians who have persistently resisted legal and ethical
imperatives to be forthcoming with clear diagnoses for terminally ill patients
may end up being vindicated. Placebo research suggests that anticipating

also Gunver S. Kienle & Helmut Kiene, The Powerful Placebo Effect: Fact or Fiction?, 50 J.

CLIN. EPIDEMIOL. 1311, 1316 (1997) ("we have not found any reliable demonstration of the
existence of placebo effects; It]here can be no doubt that the extent and frequency of placebo
effects as published in most of the literature are gross exaggerations").
8. See Kienle & Kiene, supra note 7, at 1316-17.
9. John C. Bailar, III, M.D., Ph.D., The Powerful Placeboandthe Wizard of Oz, 344 NEw

ENG. J. MED. 1630, 1631-32 (2001).
10. See Miroslav Backonja & Walter A. Brown, Harnessing the Placebo Effect, at
http:lAvww.hosppract.com/issues/1998107/cebrown.htm (1998) (suggesting that in certain presurgical scenarios, it is better to unwaveringly ensure a patient of a good outcome, rather than list
possible complications and mortality risks).
11. Steven F. Bierman observes, "In many studies patients have reacted to informed
consent-the procedure whereby the many possible risks and benefits of an agent or action are
disclosed-by exhibiting one or more of thenamed complications or benefits." Steven F. Bierman,
Of Course Mental Events Affect Physical Events, 16 ADVANCES INMIND-BODY MED. 11, 11

(2000).
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death may very well hasten its arrival. Currently, neither law nor ethics
acknowledges the common human response to medical crises-the desire
to be shielded from the truth. If sustaining hope triggers a placebo effect
that reduces pain or extends life, the law and ethics of end-of-life care must
be reconceptualized to allow physicians to nurture patient optimism.
Unyielding pursuit of patient autonomy can undermine a patient's
conviction that she will outlive the statistics, thereby destroying the placebo
effect.
More radically, proof of a powerful placebo effect would force us to
rethink what constitutes medical treatment. If placebos are therapeutically
beneficial, then physicians should incorporate them into their care of
patients, at least where placebos are more effective than extant treatments
"proven to work." Thus, many alternative therapies, whose principles and
mechanisms are inexplicable in the biomedical model, may be deemed
efficacious as placebos. Introduction of placebos into clinical practice
would compel physicians to address numerous ethical and legal issues. For
example, what is the appropriate charge for therapies whose sole benefit is
placebo? How should physicians discuss their treatment plans with patients
in a way that averts the traditional prohibition against physicians lying to
their patients?
Greater understanding of the mechanisms of the placebo effect could
have systemic implications as well. The research that increasingly points to
the therapeutic relationship as a primary source of the placebo effect
suggests that payment mechanisms that discourage physician-patient "face
time" may undermine one of the most important aspects of the healing
process. If "bed-side" interactions and holistic health care are as
instrumental to the patient's recovery as a drug or surgery, then third party
payors may find themselves pressed to pay for such care. 2 Indeed, it may
even be cost-effective.
What if the placebo effect is in fact a chimera? If this were to be
definitively determined, then physicians would be legally and ethically
compelled to discontinue using placebos for therapeutic purposes. Despite
years of admonitions to the contrary, physicians have persisted in
prescribing placebos, both for potentially legitimate (to evoke the placebo
effect) and illegitimate (with patients who are suspected to be somatizers)
reasons. Claiming that hope is important to patient health and well-being,
physicians continue to avoid telling patients the truth about their prognosis,
especially if it is terminal. Proof that the placebo effect does not exist will

12. Recent studies suggest that the process and length of time involved in workers
compensation systems create nocebo effects-participants in the system remain disabled longer,
perhaps to ensure that their claims are provable by the time they are finally considered. Changes
to the Canadian system which have shortened the time for recovery ofbenefits also have shortened
the time for recovery from illness.
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eliminate the physicians' final reason to avoid honest conversation with
their patients.
More dramatically, the nonexistence of a placebo effect would also
radically shift the debate about alternative medicine. Increasingly,
conventional medical practitioners are integrating complementary and
alternative modalities (CAM) into their treatment regimes. Although much
of CAM lacks empirical support ofits efficacy, many physicians believe that
alternative practitioners are particularly effective at evoking the placebo
response, especially in patients with chronic illnesses for which
conventional medicine has little to offer.' 3 If the placebo effect is a mirage,
then littlejustification exists for physicians to integrate unproven alternative
therapies,14 or for payors to cover them. 5 Such an outcome would have a
devastating impact on what has become a significant segment of the health
care industry.' 6
This Article considers the implications of both scenarios-that the placebo effect is real, therapeutically powerful and can be harnessed to
predictably benefit particular patients, or, alternatively, that the placebo
effect is nonexistent, and physicians should abandon use of placebos
altogether. Part II explains the competing definitions of placebos, as well
as the various hypotheses about the placebo effect. Part III examines the
literature that denies the existence of the placebo effect. It critiques the
primary studies, and concludes, as does the scientific community, that more
research is necessary before any conclusion can be reached. If it is
ultimately determined that the placebo effect does not exist, Part III
considers the implications for current medical practice which will
necessarily result if physicians must discontinue their use of therapeutic
placebos.
Part IV explores myriad potential opportunities if the placebo effect
proves to be real, and the countervailing ethical and legal barriers to
employing placebos. Ultimately, Part IV concludes that, when the placebo
effect's benefits to the patient potentially exceed those of alternatives, it
may be ethical, as well as consistent with the doctrine of informed consent
and the law governing fraud, for the physician to withhold from the patient
the fact that she is receiving a placebo. Depending upon the context, the
13. See generallyBRODY & BRODY, supra note 2, at 143-44 (discussing the role a placebo
response plays in alternative and conventional medicine).
14. It could reasonably be argued that this point should be limited to disproven CAM
modalities. Those that are merely unproven might be efficacious.
15. Kathleen M. Boozang, Is the Alternative Medicine? ManagedCare ApparentlySeems
to Think So, 32 CONN. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (2000).
16. David M. Eisenberg, M.D. et al., Trends in Alternative Medicine Use in the United
States, 1990-1997:Results ofa Follow-upNationalSurvey, 280 JAMA 1569, 1569 (1998); David
M. Eisenberg, M.D. et al., UnconventionalMedicine in the UnitedStates: Prevalence,Costs, and
Patternsof Use, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 246, 251 (1993).
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physician may be able to present the therapeutic placebo in a manner that
does not violate the prohibition against lying to patients. Specifically, if the
physician has a sufficient degree of certainty that she will achieve a
therapeutic placebo effect for the patient, then the physician's
representation to the patient that she is receiving an effective therapy is the
truth. Alternatively, patients may explicitly or implicitly agree not to be told
that they are receiving placebo therapy, thereby extricating the physician
from any ethical dilemma. Finally, withholding the fact that a patient is
receiving a placebo should not violate the legal doctrine of informed
consent: if the professional standard evolves such that physicians who
employ placebos do not tell their patients, then the physician who so acts
does so consistent with the doctrine of informed consent. Likewise, if the
physician concludes that the reasonable patient would not want to be
advised that she is receiving a placebo, then the physician may use the
placebo treatment without violating informed consent. The inappropriate
prescription ofa therapeutic placebo can be addressed through a negligence
analysis.
If. FORGING A CONSENSUS: WHAT, IF ANYTHING, Do RESEARCHERS
AGREE UPON ABOUT PLACEBOS?
It is best to begin by asking what makes sick patients "get better."
Generally, patients recover good health for one or more of the following
reasons: (1) the illness ran its natural course, or, "she got better by herself';
(2) the patient responded to her treatment; and/or 7 (3) the patient
responded to a host of other factors, that cannot be specifically identified,
but are collectively labeled placebo effect. 8 In this sense, of course,
"placebo" is simply a name placed on factors which cannot be identified. It
reflects the notion that some things in medicine are still a black box.
Physicians seeking to exploit the power of the placebo want to unpack the
black box, and understand what is hidden within. Some believe that
substantial progress has occurred in this direction. Others, of course,
believe that any placebo effect is really attributable to the illness running its
own course.
A. Sorting Through the Competing Definitions
Even among placebo believers, much disagreement exists over the
proper definitions of placebo and placebo effect, mainly because each

17. These three phenomenamay operate simultaneously. See Howard Brody, PlaceboEffect:
An Examination of Grunbaum's Definition, in PLACEBO, supra note 1, at 37, 43 (L. White et al.

eds., 1985).
18. Judith A. Turner, Ph.D. et al., The ImportanceofPlaceboEffects in PainTreatmentand

Research, 271 JAMA 1609, 1609 (1994).
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competing definition incorporates a bias toward a particular explanatory
theory of the placebo effect, about which there also is no agreement.' 9 This
section briefly explores the competing definitions of placebo to provide a
background to the competing theories on the mechanism by which placebos
work.
Arthur Shapiro provides a robust etymology of the term placebo,2"
explaining that, although it originally referred to medicines and methods,21
for most of its history from 1785 to 1951, it "describe[d] a medication,
often commonly in use, knowingly prescribed by a physician 'to please a
' When
patient' rather than for its specific effect on a symptom or illness."22
physicians were still struggling to gain a foothold as professionals, and to
achieve professional superiority over their competitors,23 they often
employed the term placebo pejoratively, to refer to the medicines offered
by non-physicians,24 not knowing, or unwilling to acknowledge, that most
of their own offerings were no better.
Throughout this period, physicians sought to understand, just as we do,
why patients got better.25 Physicians vacillated between two theories. One
model rested upon belief in the healing power of nature, accompanied by
skepticism that physicians' interventions actually made a difference
(especially positive), except in the rarest cases.26 The alternative approach
rested upon a confidence in the power of the imagination, conceding that
physicians might help patients, not because ofthe specific properties ofthe
treatment, but rather because physicians' care stimulated patients' emotions
to a cure.27 Today, while we obviously believe in the power of medicine, we
19. See Shepard Siegel, Explanatory Mechanisms of the Placebo Effect: Pavlovian

Conditioning I (conference paper on file with author).
20. ARTHUR K. SHAPIRO, M.D. & ELAINE SHAPIRO, PH.D., THE POwERFuL PLACEBO FROM
ANCIENTPRIESTTO MODERN PHYSICIAN 28 (1997). Dr. Brody explains the pre-medical use of the

word placebo:
The word placebo entered the English language in the fourteenth century as
the name for the vespers sung for the dead (Shapiro 1968). The word was derived
from the Latin version of Psalm 116:9: "Placebo Domino in regione vivorum"
(Pepper 1945), usually translated "I shall walk before the Lord in the land of the
living," although the literal translation of placebo is "Ishall please."
HOWARD BRODY, PLACEBOS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MEDICINE 9 (1980); see also HOWARD M.

SPIRO, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND PLACEBOS 10 (1986).
21. SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 38.
22. Id. at 31; see also BRODY, supra note 20, at 9.
23. See generallyTed Kaptchuk & David M. Eisenberg, Varieties of Healing.1: Medical
Pluralismin the United States, 135 ANNALS INT. MED. 189, 189-91 (2001).
24. SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 29, 39.
25. See generally Brody, supra note 17, at 40-41.

26. Id. at 41.
27. Id.
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are also revisiting the mind-body debate, conceding the possibility that in
adopting the biomedical model, we may have discarded some important
understandings about healing.
Richard Cabot, an eminent Harvard Medical School professor ofthe late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, confirmed that physicians
eventually came to rely intentionally on placebos in their practice: "I was
brought up, as I suppose every physician is, to use placebo, bread pills,
water subcutaneously, and other devices .... ."2" Placebos were thought to
be inert substances, intended to ease patients' concerns.29Henry K. Beecher
summarized the common reasons for placebo use in his important article on
placebos in 1955, including mention of its use "as a psychological
instrument in the therapy of certain ailments arising out of mental illness,
[and] as a resource of the harassed doctor in dealing with the neurotic
patient. 30
Beecher's dramatic thesis was that there exists a powerful, and
previously undetected, placebo effect that is not merely psychological but
physiological as well.3 In a review of 15 studies involving over a thousand
patients, Beecher found that an average of 35.2% of the subject patients33
' ranging from 21% to 58%.
were "satisfactorily relieved by a placebo,"32
While debate persists even today about Beecher's article,34 no one
questions that his work was instrumental in invigorating serious
consideration of placebos as an extraordinarily powerful agent.
Following Beecher's study, the placebo effect was primarily thought of
as the "black box" of the countless variables in a patient's recovery 36 that

28. Ted J. Kaptchuk, Powerful Placebo:The DarkSide ofthe Randomised ControlledTrial,
351 LANCET 1722, 1722 (1998) (quoting Richard Cabot, The Use of Truth and Falsehood in
Medicine: An Experimental Study, AM. MED. 1903, 5:344-49 (1903)).
29. See generally BRODY, supra note 20, at 9.
30. Henry K. Beecher, The Powerful Placebo, 159 JAMA 1601, 1601 (1955).
31. Id. at 165.
32. Id. at 1604 (table 2), 1605.
33. See SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 78 (discussing Beecher's work). A
subsequent study by Kissel and Barrucand also observed placebo effects ranging from 28.50/o-58%.
Id. Frederick J.Evans estimated placebos to be 550/6-6 0% as effective as most over-the counter
analgesics. Id.
34. See, e.g., Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7, at 1594 (arguing that the method used
by Beecher and others in measuring the placebo effect make it impossible to distinguish placebo
effect from "natural course of the disease, regression to the mean, and the effects of other
factors"); Gunver S. Kienle & Helmut Kiene, Placebo Effect and Placebo Concept: A Critical
Methodologicaland ConceptualAnalysis of Reports on the Magnitude of the Placebo Effect, 2
ALTERNATIVE THERAPIES HEALTH & MED. 39 (1996) (arguing that not a single study relied upon
by Beecher demonstrates a placebo effect).
35. See generallyAnne Harrington, "Seeing" the PlaceboEffect: HistoricalLegacies and
Present Opportunities6 (conference paper on file with author).
36. T.D. Borkovec, Placebo: Defining the Unknown, in PLACEBO, supra note 1, at 59, 63.
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had to be controlled in the context of clinical trials for a new treatment. 7
The "gold standard" for establishing the efficacy ofa new drug requires that
the experimental drug undergo a randomized double-blind placebo
controlled study. 38 The placebo effect itself has not been much studied. A
great deal is known about the "variables that control placebo effects...
[b]ut that is not an explanation of the placebo effect., 39 Only now are
researchers seeking to unpack what causes the placebo effect, and whether
placebos can themselves be therapeutically effective.
To provide some overview of the nuances of the various definitions of
placebo as therapy,4 and the placebo effect, this Article will next briefly

37. See generally Kaptchuk, supranote 28. This Article does not address clinicians' use of
placebos in a research context, which generally is considered the standard and appropriate method
for the conduct of a clinical trial of a new drug or, less often, procedure. A patient control group
receives a placebo, or "dummy," to enable the researchers to identify and quantify the existence
of the specific effect of the unproven therapy. See generally SPIRO, supranote 20, at 1 1-12. In
short, researchers use the placebo "to control for all the nonbiological therapeutic variance that
might contaminate the results" ofthe clinical trial. Seymour Fisher& Roger Greenberg, The Curse
of the Placebo: FancifulPursuitof a Pure Biological Therapy, in FROM PLACEBO TO PANACEA
PUTrrING PSYCHIATRIC DRUGS TOTHETEsT 4 (Seymour Fisher & Roger P. Greenberg eds., 1997).
This is not to suggest that contemporary placebo usage in clinical trials is uncontroversial. One
body of criticism goes to the sufficiency of the comparison between the drug group and the placebo
group, arguing that a no-treatment group should be added as well (to distinguish between
nonspecific effects and the natural course of the disease), and that the research design should
better control for patients' expectancies. See Connie Peck & Grahame Coleman, Implications of
PlaceboTheoryfor ClinicalResearchandPracticein PainManagement, 12 THEORETICAL MED.
247, 257-58 (1991); Turner et al., supra note 18, at 1612; see also SPIRO, supra note 20, at 12-13
(complaining about the inadequate attention researchers give to the placebo effect in control
groups which experience substantial improvement, suggesting that researchers should wonder
whether improved clinician/patient relationship, participation in a study, or some other
identifiable factor cause the patients' improvement). It is also unclear what role the Hawthorne
Effect (the effect of an observer on a study) plays in clinical trials. Id. at 14.
Other concerns about the use of placebos in clinical trials are ethical. Researchers were
sharply criticized when they published a paper on fetal tissue transplants in which they employed
sham brain surgery as a control. See Peter Clark, PlaceboSurgeryfor Parkinson'sDisease:Do
the Benefits Outweigh the Risks?, 58 J.L. & MED. ETHICS 69 (2002); Ruth Macklin, The Ethical
Problemswith Sham Surgery in ClinicalResearch, 341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 992 (1999); W. John
Thomas, Informed Consent, The PlaceboEffect, andthe Revenge of Thomas Percival,22 J. LEGAL
MED. 313, 346 (2001). Many also criticize the use of a placebo as a control where effective
therapy exists, arguing that the new therapy's effectiveness should be judged against extant
treatment, and that no patient should be asked to forgo effective treatment for the sake of research.
See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or
UnethicalPractice?,33 CONN. L. REV. 449 (2001); Timothy S. Jost, The GlobalizationofHealth
Law: The Case of Permissibilityof Placebo-basedResearch, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 175 (2000);
Kenneth J. Rothman & Karin B. Michels, The ContinuingUnethicalUse ofPlaceboControls,331
NEW ENG. J. MED. 394 (1994).
38. Kaptchuk, supra note 28, at 1724.
39. Ader, supra note 5, at 9.
40. Each definition of placebo includes a reference to its use as a control in experimental
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discuss the different perspectives on placebos offered by Arthur Shapiro
and Howard Brody. The discussion then turns to Howard Spiro, who insists
that the placebo effect produces only subjective relief for patients.
Arthur Shapiro hypothesizes that
[a] placebo is any therapy (or that component of any
therapy)4' that is intentionally or knowingly used for its
nonspecific, psychological, or psychophysiological,
therapeutic effect, or that is used for a presumed specific
therapeutic effect on a patient, symptom, or illness but is
without specific activity for the condition being treated.42
As do most researchers in the area, Shapiro recognizes that a placebo may
not produce a placebo effect, 43 and that a placebo effect may be positive or

medicine. Shapiro, for example, states that "[a] placebo, when used as a control in experimental
studies, is a substance of procedure that is without specific activity for the condition being
treated." SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 41. Brody explains:
In medical research, a placebo is an intervention designed to mimic the modality
or process being studied, but without any of its nonsymbolic healing properties,
so as to serve as a control in a double-blind trial (in which the control group gets
a dummy treatment, and neither the subjects nor the investigators know which
group gets the active treatment and which gets the dummy).
Brody, supra note 17, at 14; see also BRODY, supra note 20, at 43 (referring to placebo use to
"eliminate observer bias in an experimental setting"); SPIRO, supra note 20, at II(distinguishing
placebo in research protocols from placebo in clinical practice). This Article does not address the
issues that arise from the use of placebo controls in the experimental setting.
41. Shapiro assumes that active treatments may contain placebo components, a proposition
with which both Adolf Grunbaum and Howard Brody would agree. Grunbaum makes this point
by distinguishing between the "characteristic" and "incidental" factors of a therapy, whereby the
incidental factors may enhance the remedial effects ofthetreatment. AdolfGrunbaum, Explication
and Implications of the Placebo Concept, in PLACEBO, supra note 1, at14-16. Brody focuses on
the benefits of the therapeutic context, which he suggests boosts the effectiveness of the active
medication. BRODY, supra note 20, at 32.
42. SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO,.supra note 20, at 41. Grunbaum differentiates the two scenarios
posed in Shapiro's definition by labeling them as "intentional placebo" and "inadvertant placebo."
Grunbaum, supra note 41, at 13. Enhancing Shapiro's approach, Grunbaum creates an umbrella
category of the genus placebo, of which intentional and inadvertant placebos are species. What
intentional and inadvertant placebos share, Grunbaum argues, is the objective property that they
are not remedial for the patient's condition. Id. at 17, 22. Any therapy that includes at least one
factor that is remedial will qualify as a nonplacebo (Grunbaum rejects the terms specific and nonspecific, and discusses instead whether an intervention contains a remedial component). Id. at 23.
Brody rejects the concept of placebo genus, for reasons exemplified by an example: under
Grunbaum's approach, Brody asserts, potassium cyanide could be a generic placebo for a cold,
which, Brody suggests, cannot be what Grunbaum intends. Brody, supra note 17, at 44.
43. SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 42.
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negative. " Significant to Shapiro's definition is an objective determination
of whether something is a placebo;45 the physician's intent or belief being
irrelevant (although the definition recognizes that the physician's use of the
placebo may be "unwitting").46
Howard Brody prefers, on the other hand, a subjective definition of
placebo:47 "In therapeutic healing, a placebo is a treatment modality or
process administered with the beliefthat it possesses the ability to affect the
body only by virtue of its symbolic significance."4' Differentiating himself
sharply from Shapiro, Brody's definition relies on the physician's
therapeutic beliefs.49 Brody carries this subjectivity into his definition of
placebo effect, into which he also incorporates the patient's beliefs, which
he culturally contextualizes ° "[a] change in the body (or the body-mind
unit) that occurs as the result of the symbolic significance which one
attributes to an event or object in the healing environment."'" Brody
situates the placebo effect in the category of "general therapies," because
of its ability to "effect change in virtually any potentially reversible disease
or disorder in medicine."52 Brody speculates that while "specific"
treatments have approximately a 75%-95% probability of being efficacious
for a few illnesses, "a placebo has a 30%-40% probability of being

44. Grunbaum, supra note 41, at 15-16; SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supranote 20, at 42; Brody,
supra note 17, at 10. Some have adopted the term nocebo effect to refer to the negative effects of
a placebo. See, e.g., Daniel E. Moerman, Meaningful Dimensions ofMedical Care 2 (conference
paper on file with author).
45. SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 41. As such, a therapy does not qualify if the
physician thinks that it is a placebo but it actually turns out not to be. Grunbaum, supra note 41,
at 13. Brody takes a subjective approach. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
46. Grunbaum, supra note 41, at 12-13. Spiro would seem to take this position as well: "A
placebo therapy may be used with or without knowledge that it is a placebo. Included among
placebos are treatments that are given in the belief that they are effective but that actually are
placebos by objective evaluation." SPIRO, supra note 20, at 1-2.
47. See Brody, supra note 17, at 44.
48. BRODY & BRODY, supra note 2, at 14; see also BRODY, supra note 20, at 43.
49. Brody, supra note 17, at 44. Brody also allows for alternative paradigms of belief.
BRODY, supra note 20, at 42.
50. BRODY, supra note 20, at 42.
51. BRODY & BRODY, supra note 2, at 9. The Brodys' reference to the "healing
environment" seeks to exclude from placebo effect "any form of autosuggestion or self-fulfilling
prophecy, whether or not connected with disease of healing." Brody, supranote 17, at 45; see also
BRODY & BRODY, supranote 2, at 9. As long as the patient believes he is in the healing context,
he need not believe the treatment being given is efficacious, but only that it is treatment, a
deliberate intervention given in response to his illness with beneficial intent." BRODY, supra note
20, at 35 (Brody looks then at intent of the caregiver, and belief of the patient). Thus, the meaning
of placebo effect is "context-dependent." Id. at 36.
Spiro takes a much broader approach. For him, placebos include "any treatments, no matter
how potentially specific and no matter who administers them." SPIRO, supra note 20, at 1-2.
52. BRODY, supra note 17, at 46.
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placebos to
efficacious for almost any disorder."53 Thus, Brody analogizes
"general" therapies along with diet, exercise and rest.5 4
While adopting Howard Brody's definitional approach, with its
emphasis onphysician intent," Howard Spiro departs from both Brody and
Shapiro in his understanding of the scope of the placebo effect. Spiro
believes that the placebo effect is limited to subjective complaints and pain
relief.56 He observes, "The placebo response may ameliorate diseases, but
the evidence is not available, or at least I have not found it."57 After years
of rejection by the medical community, Spiro's position may now be
supported by the Danish study.
This Article proceeds on the premise that placebos comprise any
intervention (whether a pill, surgery or the therapeutic relationship),
administered in a healing context, that is not specific" to the patient's
condition, 9 but nonetheless may hold the potential to induce a

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. SPIRO, supra note 20, at 19.
56. Id. at 85.
57. Id. at 85; see also id. at 88-89. But see Ian Wickramasekera, A ConditionedResponse
Model of the PlaceboEffect: Predictionsfrom the Model, in PLACEBO, supra note 1, at 255-56

("Placebo effects are not limited to the relief of acute pain. Placebos may be useful in the therapy
of coughs, headaches, asthma, multiple sclerosis, the common cold, diabetes, ulcers, arthritis,
emesis, seasickness, cancer, parkinsonism, and other ailments.").
58. Daniel Moerman provides one of the better explanations of the distinction between
"specific effect" and "placebo effect." "Generally speaking, there are three sorts of healing
processes: autonomousones based on the immunological and homoeostatic processes of the body,
specific ones based on the pharmacological or physical dimensions of the healing process, and
meaningful ones based on knowledge and interaction." Daniel E. Moerman, Cultural Variations
in the Placebo Effect: Ulcers, Anxiety, and Blood Pressure, 14(1) MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 51,

56 (2000).
59. Arthur Shapiro defines "specific activity" as "the therapeutic influence attributable
solely to the contents or processes of the therapies rendered." A.K. Shapiro & L.A. Morris, The
Placebo Effect in Medical and Psychological Therapies, in S.L. GARFIELD & A.E. BERGIN,
HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BEHAVIOR CHANGE

(1978), quotedin Grunbaum, supranote

41, at 12. Some avoid reference to specific vs. non-specific, complaining that it creates too many

ambiguities. See, e.g., Grunbaum, supra note 41, at 21. Grunbaum thinks about whether a therapy
is remedial. If it is, it is not a placebo. Id. at 23; see also Brody, supra note 17, at 46. Others
suggest beginning with an entirely new vocabulary to talk about the placebo phenomenon. See
generallyPeck & Coleman, supra note 37, at 248-29. Peck and Coleman criticize the current use
of singular terminology because it suggests a unitary effect, id. at 248, when the term actually
describes "a group of effects whose specific mechanisms of action we do not yet understand, but
whose efficacy has been demonstrated in thousands of studies." Id. at 249.
Some would argue that a placebo is in fact "specific" to certain conditions, such as
"hypochondriasis, psychophysiologic disturbances, and most emotional disorders." Herbert M.
Adler & Van Buren 0. Hammett, The Doctor-PatientRelationshipRevisited: An Analysis of the
Placebo Effect, 78 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 595, 595 (1973). Further, Bootzin and Caspi claim
that "the effects of the placebo can be highly specific. They include effects, such as pain reduction,
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psychological or physiologic therapeutic response in some patients, by a
mechanism not yet understood.6" This approach embraces the contemporary
understanding ofplacebo effect, which focuses upon the positive6 ' healing6 2
effects resulting from the symbolic import of the placebo, as well as the
context (a setting understood by the patient to be a healing environment)
in which the placebo is used.63 This concept ofplacebo effect encompasses
effective treatments that may have placebo effects in addition to what are
understood to be their specific curative or ameliorative effects. 4
B. Hypotheses About How Placebos Work
Most frustrating to those interested in therapeutic utilization of the
placebo effect is that it remains unknown why or on whom placebos work.
An initial question is whether placebos, to the extent they exist at all, affect
subjective well-being, symptoms, or biological-functioning.65 Those who
believe that placebos contribute to healing subscribe to two very different
concepts of healing: (1) the biological events that result in cure, or (2) the
therapeutic process which enhances health and well-being. 6 Those in the
first group believe that placebos can catalyze the body's ability to
spontaneously begin to heal: "[p]lacebo effects are not limited to the relief
of acute pain. Placebos may be useful in the therapy of coughs, headaches,
asthma, multiple sclerosis, the common cold, diabetes, ulcers, arthritis,

healing of a peptic ulcer, bronchodilation in asthmatics and the like." Bootzin & Caspi, supranote
6, at 3.
60. See Irving Kirsch, Specifying Nonspecifics: Psychological Mechanisms of Placebo
Effects, in THE PLACEBO EFFECT 166-67 (Harrington ed. 1997). See generally Bootzin & Caspi,
supra note 6, at 2.
61. Obviously, a nocebo (negative) effect can also occur. Sheperd Siegel suggests the
possibility that nocebo effects might be compensatory reactions to placebos. See infra note 62.
62. Siegal notes that the definitions can be distinguished by whether the definition of
placebo effect refers to "any physiological response to an innocuous treatment that is not
explained by the properties of the treatment," Siegal, supra note 19, as opposed to whether the
placebo must have a therapeuticeffect, which is, for example, Brody's view, Brody, supra note
17, at 46.
63. See generally Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 6.
64. Henry K. Beecher described this as early as 1956, when he explained that "[t]he total
drug effect is equal to its 'active' effect plus its placebo effect." Henry K. Beecher, The Powerful
Placebo, 159 JAMA 1659, 1606 (1956). The assumption is, of course, that placebos have only the
non-specific psychological component. See Richard R. Bootzin, The Role of Expectancy in
Behavior Change, in PLACEBO, supra note 1, at 196, 197. Many researchers criticize this model,
which assumes an independence between the psychological and the physiologial. Id. Researchers
suggest that the "so-called 'nonspecific' psychological component of taking medication for a
particular problem could affect the same specific physiological mechanisms that are affected by
pharmacologically active agents." Id.
65. Bootzin & Caspi, supranote 6, at 13-14.
66. Id. at 14.
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emesis, seasickness, cancer, parkinsonism, and other ailments."6 7 Those in
the second group refer to the patient's "spiritual, emotional, cognitive,
physical, social, and environmental
functioning which facilitate the
68
individual's development.,
Howard Brody proposes a model for thinking about placebo effect
theories within three categorical explanations. 69 The first level of
explanations attempts to explain the clinical operation of placebos.7" The
second level of explanations theorizes the placebo action.7 The third level
of explanations seeks to explain the mind-body interaction that occurs when
placebos affect the patient's status.72 In short, level one explanations seek
to identify the stimuli that will cause the placebo effect; level two theories
explain how these stimuli affect the brain; level three theories explain how
the brain communicates with the body. The following represents a
categorization of placebo theories in three levels of explanations:

67. BRODY, sutpra note 20.
68. Id. at 16. Explaining characteristic versus incidental, Drs. Bootzin and Caspi introduce
the hypotheses about how placebos work by describing the "schools of thought" into which the
various approaches fall:
(1)Directly-through the activation of innate homeostatic healing processes,
often referred to as spontaneous healing regardless of what the biological
treatment might be. For instance, the characteristic elements of antibiotics in the
case of viral pharyngitis may by ineffective, yet the incidental ones may trigger
the placebo effect ....
(2) Indirectly-through patient behavior as a mediating variable. For instance
Horowitz and Horowitz found that patients who adhered more to the placebo
treatment, in clinical trials across conditions, had better outcomes than those who
did not. One plausible explanation might be that those who adhered might also
have engaged in other good health-related activities, and that the incidental
element of adhering to the treatment protocol may have affected their outcome.
(3) Interaction of active and indirect effects with the total package of care ....
That is, treatments may be more or less effective depending on the interaction of
meaning with active change ingredients.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
69. See generallyHoward Brody, The PlaceboResponse: Recent Researchandlmplications
for Family Medicine, 49 J. FAM. PRAC. 649 (2000).
70. See generally id.
71. See generally id.
72. See id. at 651. Anne Harrington provides a categorization of every placebo theory
advanced since the 1950s that remains viable, which is a helpful introduction into the literature,
and in sorting through the various explanations of the placebo effect. Harrington, supra note 35,
at 12.
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FIRST LEVEL
a. Identifying the
Placebo Reactor

SECOND LEVEL
a. Conditioning

b. The meaning
model

b. Expectancy
I

THIRD LEVEL
Brain biochemistry:
e.g., endorphins

I

_I

1. First Level Explanations
a. Identifying the "Placebo Reactor"
Characterizing the person who is susceptible to placebos, the "placebo
reactor," has proven to be one of the most fruitless enterprises pursued by
placebo researchers,73 who have concluded that the placebo reactor does
not exist.7 4 Consequently, the generally accepted wisdom is that
"demographic variables such as age, sex, intelligence, race, social class,
ethnicity, religiosity, or religious background" are unreliable predictors of
who will respond to placebos." Neither is susceptibility to hypnosis nor
suggestibility indicative of response to placebos.76 More recently,
researchers still on the trail of characterizing the placebo reactor have, with
some empirical support, suggested that individuals who tend to be
anxious," are Type A personalities,78 or are sociable79 react to placebos."0
73. Physicians ofprior times have variously speculated that placebo reactors are "compliant,
religious, hypochondriac, anxious, as less educated and frequently using cathartics; disturbed and
likely to react to drugs with atypical reactions; anxious and depressed; dependent; ideational;
neurotic; extroverted; and so on." SPIRO,supranote 20, at 91-92. The Brodys assert that the entire
enterprise of identifying placebo responders was unscientific; they suggest that it was pursued by
researchers seeking to eliminate from clinical trials those who might taint the outcomes by being
too susceptible to placebos. BRODY & BRODY, supra note 2, at 35.
74. See BRODY& BRODY, supra note 2, at 35; SPIRO, supra note 20, at 91.
75. See SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO, supra note 20, at 234.
76. Id. at 234. But see Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 272-74 (critiquing studies which
concluded that susceptibility to hypnosis is not a predictor of placebo responsiveness).
77. See D.M. Chaput de Saintonge & Andrew Herxheimer, HarnessingPlaceboEffects in
HealthCare, 344 LANCET 995, 996 (1994) (placebo response strongest in those who are "anxious,
dependent, and non-critical"); N.K. Rosenberg et al., Characteristics of PanicDisorderPatients
RespondingtoPlacebo,365 ACTAPSYCHIATRICASCANDANAVICA 33,36-37 (Supp. 1991) (finding
significant placebo response in patients with non-severe panic disorder); SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO,
supra note 20, at 235; SPIRO, supra note 20, at 92.
78. See Milou-Daniel Drici et al., Influence of the Behaviour Pattern on the Nocebo
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Many agree that "high acquiescers' ' are not only more susceptible to the
effects of placebos, but to active drugs as well. 2 When all is said and done,
though, "the placebo effect is regarded as a contextual situational
phenomenon more than an enduring personality trait."83
So, what do we do with a conclusion that suggests that we cannot
predict who will successfully respond to placebos? One obvious response
is that physicians should not employ placebos for therapeutic purposes until
more is understood. Dr. Brody argues otherwise-that everyone is a
potential placebo reactor, and that physicians should therefore regularly
incorporate placebos into their clinical practice.' The next sections describe
how this might be done.
b. The Meaning Model
The "meaning model" of the placebo effect85 hypothesizes that the
placebo effect mostly depends upon the therapeutic relationship and its

Response of Healthy Volunteers, 39 BR. J. CLIN. PHARMACOL. 204, 204 (1995) (confirming that
Type A personalities are more likely to report side effects of placebo).
79. See Fisher & Greenberg, supra note 37, at 33 (discussing trend in research suggesting
greater placebo response in persons "described as sociable or interested in relating to others than
in those who are characterized as self-sufficient and inclined toward being distant from others").
80. See Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 6, at 6-7 (summarizing literature rebutting recent
attempts at identifying the placebo responder, and affirming that no such person exists).
81. See, e.g., Fisher & Greenberg, supra note 37, at 34,39 (advocating that desire to please,
or acquiescence, predicts placebo response); MICHAEL JOSPE, THE PLACEBO EFFECT INHEALING
90-91 (1978) (summarizing research which suggests that the placebo reactor personality does
exist, focusing particularly on acquiescence, those who become anxious, and those who rely on
others); C. Crowe McMann et al., The Role of PersonalityFactorsand Suggestion in Placebo
Effect During Mental Stress Test, 33 BR. J.CLIN. PHARMACOL. 107, 109 (1991) (surveying
research suggesting correlation between placebo response and tendency to acquiesce, and
concluding that non-responders to placebo were more authoritative and aggressive).
82. Fisher & _Qreenberg, supra note 37, at 39 (acquiescence predicts positive therapeutic
response to placebos and frequently negative response to active drugs, which establishes overlap
between "active" drug and placebo).
83. Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 6, at 7.
84. BRODY & BRODY, supra note 2, at 36.
85. Anxious to shed the negative implications of the "placebo effect", many advocates of
placebo theory suggest renaming it, with competing alternatives including "remembered wellness"
and context effects. Herbert Benson & Richard Friedman, Harnessingthe Power of the Placebo
Effect and Renaming It "Remembered Wellness," 47 ANN. REV. MED. 193, 195 (1996)
(remembered wellness suggests that an anxiety-reducing relationship with the physician, and
environmental factors such as the treatment room, will enable the patient to recall previously
successful treatments, thereby contributing to the alleviation of symptoms). See, e.g., Chris van
Weel, Examination of Context of Medicine, 357 LANCET 733, 733 (2001); Zelda Di Blasi et al.,
Influence of Context Effects on Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review, 357 LANCET 757, 757
(200 1) (context effects refers to the various environmental factors that may enhance the effect of
the specific interventions used to treat the patient).
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constituent elements. The research in this area "suggests that the placebo
response is more likely to occur in the clinic when the patient regards the
clinician as experienced, competent, and optimistic, and when the clinician
expects the treatment to help."86 This approach asserts that the clinical
encounter can evoke both psychological and physiological responses, and
is, therefore, itself active treatment, or a method of enhancing the specific
effect of the medicine or procedure provided by the physician. 7
So, for example, Howard Brody posits that the physician-patient
encounter can itselfact as placebo" if the patient feels heard and is satisfied
with the explanation ofhis illness; the patient feels cared for; and the patient
feels some sense of control over his symptoms.89 Capitalizing on the
placebo effect in the treatment setting is argued to be particularly important
in the primary care context, where a positive therapeutic encounter may be
the most efficacious treatment available.9" A few studies support this
proposition." For example, one study suggested that patients with minor
illnesses for which no definitive diagnosis could be made showed greater
satisfaction, and recovered more quickly, when they received a positive
consultation--either a placebo prescription or a confident indication that
they would recover quickly, than when they received a negative
consultation-expression of uncertainty about what was wrong or a
placebo prescription with an expression of doubt that it would work.92

86. Bootzin & Caspi, supra note 6, at 7.
87. Moerman, supra note 44, at 1-2.
88. See Brody, supra note 69, at 649, 650.
89. Id.; Howard Brody & David B. Waters, Diagnosisis Treatment, 10 J.FAM. PRAC. 445,
448-49 (1980); see also Benson & Friedman, supra note 85, at 195 (emphasizing positivism in
physician-patient encounter).
90. It is estimated that physicians are unable to diagnose a high proportion of the symptoms
they encounter (40-60%), B.K. Thomas, General PracticeConsultations:Is There Any Point in
Being Positive?,294 BRIT. MED. J. 1200, 1200 (1987), and that stress and anxiety are frequently
determined to be the underlying cause ofthe patient's complaints. See Benson & Friedman, supra
note 85, at 195; Brody & Waters, supra note 89. It is hypothesized that empathy and conversation
designed to identify the source of the patient's symptoms can double as effective treatment
methods where drugs or surgery are useless. K.B. Thomas, The Placeboin GeneralPractice,344
LANCET 1066 (1994) (hereinafter General Practice)(declaring that doctor's use of their own
therapeutic power "would result in the making of less illness, the prescribing of less medication,
and a better understanding by the patient of his or her condition").
91. See Moira A. Stewart, Effective Physician-Patient Communication and Health
Outcomes: A Review, 152 J.CAN. MED. Assoc. 1423, 1429 (1996) (reviewing several studies of
effect of physician style on patient outcomes and concluding that "effective communication exerts
a positive influence not only on the emotional health of the patient but also on symptom
resolution, functional and physiologic status, and pain control"). See generallyNancy Leopold et
al., SustainedPartnershipin Primary Care, 42 J. FAM. PRAc. 129 (1996).
92. Thomas, supra note 90, at 1201-02. Another study suggests that compassionate
emergency room treatment can decrease the number of repeat visits and substantially improve
patients' perception of the quality of their care. See generally Donald A. Redelmeier et al., A
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Brody and Waters suggest that even the process of explaining a
patient's diagnosis carries meaning for the patient and her family, and can
negatively or positively impact the patient's health.93 Negative attributions
can produce the nocebo effect. In taking the patient's history, placebo
researchers recommend that physicians identify prior treatments or settings
reintroducing
that have been unsuccessful for the patient, and avoid
94
treatments that have negative meanings for the patient.
The physician and patient's confidence in a treatment, and the positive
beliefs and expectations they ascribe to it, can convert an "ineffective"
treatment into an effective one.9 5 Effective sham surgeries, as well as
surgeries believed to be successful when popular, but later proven to be
ineffective, are the more prevalently cited examples of this phenomenon.
Some suggest that chiropractic therapy, which is widely believed by
patients to be effective,97 epitomizes the powei of meaning in the treatment
context:

Randomised Trial of Compassionate Care for the Homeless in an Emergency Department, 345
LANCET 1131, 1133 (1995).
93. Brody & Waters, supra note 89, at 445. Their observations are grounded in a belief that
physical and mental health are inextricably linked, requiring the physician to always be attendant
to both mind and body. Id. at 449. DiBlasi and colleagues propose a similar analytical model,
embracing the concepts of cognitive care and emotional care within the term "context effects."
DiBlasi et al., supra note 85. Cognitive care refers to the effect physicians can have on patient
expectations by their positive or negative descriptions of the patient's condition or treatment. Id.
Emotional care refers to physician alleviation of fear and anxiety. Id. Context effects refers to the
placebo effects that derive from these techniques, which, Di Blasi et al. posit, do have positive
effects on patient outcomes. Id. van Weel suggests that context effects have their greatest value
"in their enhancement of specific interventions-so that efficacy of a dose is maximized, or so that
the dose or number of medicines required can be reduced." van Weel, supra note 85, at 733.
94. Benson & Friedman, supra note 85, at 195. de Saintonge and Herxheimer suggest that
awareness of the placebo effect is essential throughout the physician-patient encounter. See de
Saintonge & Herxheimer, supra note 77, at 995. The history should elicit information about prior
bad experiences with treatments or health care providers; problems that are undiagnosable require
explanation and reassurance; placebo options should be analyzed from an effectiveness, toxicity
and cost perspective. See id.
95. Benson & Friedman, supra note 85, at 197.
96. See generally Moerman, supra note 44, at 6 (discussing several examples of placebo
surgery, including the famous experience with bilateral internal mammary artery ligation
(BIMAL), which was deemed very effective treatment for angina until subjected to a clinical trial
in which patients who received the sham surgery did better than those subjected to BIMAL; this
experience is frequently cited as evidence of the placebo effect that is possible from ineffective
surgery, because physicians and their patients believed in it).
97. T.W. Meade, et al., Randomized Comparison ofChiropractic and Hospital Outpatient
Management for Low Back Pain: Results from Extended Follow-up, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 349
(1995); T.W. Meade et al., Low Back Pain of Mechanical Origin: Randomised Comparison of
Chiropractic and Hospital Outpatient Treatment, 300 BRIT. MED. J. 1431 (1990); Shekelle et. al.,
Spinal Manipulation for Low-Back Pain, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 590 (1992).
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The chiropractor immediately carries out a focused, pointed,
attentive examination asking pertinent questions about history,
injury, mobility and so on, asking you to bend this way and
that, usually taking x-rays and showing them to you, pointing
out misaligned vertebrae, explaining the course of treatment,
its goals and likelihood of success. The walls in a
chiropractor's office are frequently hung with large posters
displaying the spine, explaining its function and workings;
there are colorful brochures explaining the history and value
of chiropractic treatment. Occasionally one finds articles,
popular or scholarly, photocopied perhaps, showing the
results ofstudies on the effectiveness of chiropractic. One may
even see a model of an actual spine with simulated spinal
nerves arrayed along it, hanging from a doorknob. The entire
experience is validating, encouraging, supportive and positive.
We haven't yet had an adjustment and we feel better already.
The adjustment, on an elaborate adjustable table, is itself
replete with satisfying pops and snaps, rolling over, and just
enough pain to suggest that something good may come from
it.
In this way, the case of chiropractic is similar to the
abandoned treatments discussed earlier: 70 or 80% of patients
achieve satisfactory treatment outcomes marked by
measurable subjective and objective improvement with
enthusiastically employed techniques-rich in
meaning-which seem not to be substantially
more effective
98
than sham treatments in blind trials.
Today, the placebo effect is frequently relied upon to justify integration of
complementary and alternative therapies, even if they are not proven to be
efficacious through clinical trials, because patients have such confidence in
CAM. 99

98. See generally Moerman, supra note 44, at 13-14.
99. See BRODY & BRODY, supra note 2, at 143-44 (stating that alternative medicine relies
more on placebo effect than conventional medicine, which is particularly important with patients
for whom conventional medicine is ineffective, or who fail to respond to placebo stimuli in the
context of conventional medicine); Backonja & Brown, supra note 10 (web article indicating that
alternative medicine placebo effect may be safer choice "[w]ith conditions that are self-limited,
or are relatively minor, or for which there is no fully satisfactory conventional treatment"); see
also C.R.B. Joyce, Placebo and Complementary Medicine, 344 LANCET 1279, 1281 (1994)
(indicating that inadequate evidence exists to establish definitively whether complementary
methods are placebos).
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2. Second Level Explanations
Second level explanations elucidate the connection between the placebo
and the brain. They seek to explain the mechanism of the placebo effect.
This section discusses conditioning and expectancy theories.
a. Conditioning
The conditioning theory rests on the premise that neutral stimuli, when
paired with a biologically significant stimulus, can produce conditioned
responses.°" For example, clinic odors associated in the patient's mind with
chemotherapy-induced nausea can cause nausea.'0 ' Researchers interested
in therapeutic use of placebos hope to use them, through conditioning, to
ameliorate pain or induce recovery. 2 Consequently, they focus on the
relationship between active medication and placebo effect. Specifically, they
foresee two different ways that conditioning can be employed to achieve a

100. Michael Jospe provides a helpful explanation of conditioning or learning theory
generally:
The two major approaches in learning theory are classical (or respondent or
Pavlovian) conditioning and instrumental (or operant or Skinnerian)
conditioning. In classical conditioning, an unconditioned stimulus such as food
is presented to a subject. The response, salivation, that is elicited is known as the
unconditioned response. Now, if another stimulus, such as the sound of a bell,
is presented simultaneously with orjust after the food, the previously neutral bell
may, after a number of pairings, elicit the response, salivation, when it is
presented to the subject without food. The response the bell alone elicits is called
a conditioned response. The persistent absence of the unconditioned stimulus
(food) will result in a weakening and eventual diminution or cessation of the
conditioned response (salivation) in a process known as extinction.
A conditioned response, once acquired, is not solely elicited by stimuli
identical to the original stimulus. Other similar stimuli may elicit the response
in a process known as generalization. The degree to which the new stimulus is
similar to the original stimulus will affect the strength of the response, with the
amount of generalization being positively correlated with the similarity of the
second stimulus with the original stimulus situation.
JOSPE, supra note 81, at 10-11; see also Siegel, supra note 19.
101. Siegel, supra note 19, at 4.
102. See Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 259,263; see also BRODY, supra note 20, at 21.
Similarly, neutral stimuli can have nocebo effects. "Neutral stimuli (CSs) associated with the
onset and course of the disease reactions (UCRs) may become negative CSs. These CSs may elicit
CRs that potentiate the UCRs or disease reactions, by either directly or indirectly inhibiting
mechanisms of immunocompetence." Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 263. For a more
skeptical review of conditioning theorists' work, see SPIRO, supra note 20, at 211-26.
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therapeutic placebo effect: with active medication alone or with medication
plus stimuli." 3
Dr. Ian Wickramasekera sees conditioning as an opportunity to increase
the potency of active medication.04 Drug administration is generally
preceded by a variety of events, such as the appearance of a medical
professional, or the preparation of the patient for a shot.'0 5 Wickramasekera
posits, then, that active interventions elicit both the specific effect of the
intervention (the nonplacebo response), and the learned response to the
treatment setting (the placebo response).'0 6 The resultant hypothesis: "that
intrinsic to all effective interventions or events (chemical, surgical,
psychological, or psychophysiological).., is the potential for Pavlovian
conditioning, and therefore for placebo learning."'0 7 The therapeutic
potential is the use of active ingredients to produce more, stronger, and
longer lasting placebo effects with an efficacious intervention.'0 8 The
conditioning theory suggests that health care professionals should attempt
to increase the specific effect of a therapeutic intervention by engaging in
a routine when administering treatment to patients that the patients will
associate with the effects of the active intervention, thereby potentially
increasing the power of those effects through a conditional response. As
explained by Dr. Wickramasekera,
[t]hese credible signals may be quite diverse: (1) The labeling
ofthe therapist (e.g. "doctor," "swami," "professor," etc.) can
influence his or her attention and arousal stimulus value in a
given culture. (2) The credibility of the therapeutic setting
(e.g., emergency room of a hospital, temple, university
medical center, park bench) can also influence the abovedescribed mechanisms of learning. The university medical
103. In describing the goal of placebo treatment, de Saintonge and Herxheimer state:
We need to choose a combination of non-specific treatment with specific
treatments with a view to maximising the total absolute benefit (i.e., benefit
minus risk) to the patient. This combination uses the smallest amount of each
treatment to give the specified effect and is therefore likely to be most costefficient.
de Saintonge & Herxheimer, supra note 77, at 996.
104. See generally Wickramasekera, supra note 57.
105. Siegel, supra note 19, at 9.
106. Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 265. Robert Ader questions whether a neutral
stimulus that has a therapeutic effect on a patient is properly called a placebo: "A conditioned
stimulus is neutral only the first time that it is presented; once it has been paired with an
unconditioned stimulus, it is no longer neutral." Ader, supra note 5. The first part of Shapiro's
placebo definition would seem to encompass conditioning theory, as would Brody's.
107. Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 265.
108. Id.
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center, in North American culture, is the new temple of
healing."°9
The mode of treatment can influence the treatment's effectiveness, largely
depending upon the meanings the patient attributes to its characteristics." 0
For example, two tablets are more effective than one, red tablets act as
stimulants, and blue as depressants, and brand named drugs work better
than generics."' This suggests that the recent trend toward integrating
biomedicine with complementary therapies,"1 2whether they are remedies
that are ethnically, culturally, or religiously derived," 3 is not merely a
matter ofpatient respect and cultural sensitivity, but may indeed contribute
to the patient's cure by increasing the therapeutic effect of the therapy capitalizing on the placebo effect. Because meaning is culturally mediated,' it
is important to provide health care with stimuli relevant to the patient's
personal history.
The second conditioning approach explores the placebo possibilities of
interspersing active medications" 11 with neutral stimuli.'"6 Research suggests

109. Id. at 271.
110. Research also suggests that the placebo effect can vary by condition within a culture.
Moerman, supra note 58, at 63. So, for example, an ulcer study observed very high placebo rates
in Germany, but extremely low rates in Brazil. Id. Italians were most resistant in a multi-national
comparison to placebos for anxiety disorder. Id. Several fascinating studies establish a connection
between patients' cultural understanding of disease and longevity. One study links decreased life
expectancy for Chinese-American patients who believe in Chinese astrology and are diagnosed
with the condition for which their birth year is unfavorable. David P. Phillips et al., Psychology
and Survival, 342 LANCET 1142 (1993). Adler and Hammett hypothesize that the placebo effect
enables patients to fulfill their need for meaning in a group system, whether it be through the
physician-patient relationship, Alcoholics Anonymous, faith healing or psychotherapy. Adler &
Hammett, supra note 59, at 597-98.
11I. See Moerman, supra note 58, at 2-3 (surveying the literature). The meaning attributed
to certain characteristics can vary by culture; however, one study showed that using blue sleeping
pills may not be effective for Italian men, who associate blue with the national soccer team. Id.
at9.
112. See generally Boozang, supra note 15, at 572-76.
113. See generally BARRIE R. CASSILETH, THE ALTERNATIVE MEDICINE HANDBOOK 16-47
(1998) (surveying "routes to health and spiritual fulfillment" that derive from early healing
systems rooted in spiritual beliefs and particular cultures).
114. Wickramasekera elaborates: "the culture-specific context of learning can influence
placebo learning through the determination of attentional and arousal mechanisms and the
specification of what is a 'credible' CS for a given subject." Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at
271-72.
115. See SPIRo, supra note 20, at 215 (citation omitted). Peck and Coleman elaborate:
Since one of the benefits of partial reinforcement (as has been shown by
numerous conditioning studies) is increased resistance to extinction, it is
conceivable that by interspersing conditioned placebo and nonplacebo treatments
(once conditioning has been acquired), one might be able to maintain therapeutic
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that, once an effective drug treatment regime has commenced," 7 patients
can be conditioned to experience the same pharmacotherapeutic benefits of
the drug regime from an active drug/placebo combination.' 18 Robert Ader
suggests the following therapeutic benefits if this research holds true:
For patients maintained on long-term pharmacotherapeutic
regimens, especially in the case of drugs with noxious or
deleterious "side effects" such as adrenal steroids or other
immunosuppressive agents, the prescription of partial
schedules of drug reinforcement might reduce the total
amount of drug required to treat some pathophysiological
condition or maintain some physiologic state within
homeostatic limits ....
Conversely, under conditions in which the clinician might
want to increase the dose of medication but is constrained by
toxic target organ effects, an ostensible increase in the amount
of drug being taken might be achieved by keeping the dose
constant but using placebos to increase the number of
occasions per day or per week on which medication would be
taken ....
Treatment under a partial schedule of drug reinforcement
is likely to reduce the magnitude of side effects because CRs
are not typically as large as UCRs. If side effects are reduced,

benefits overthe long-term with only small amounts ofnonplacebo reinforcement
in order to avoid extinction of the conditioned placebo response.

Peck & Coleman, supra note 37, at 263.
116. Robert Ader, The Role ofConditioning in Pharmacotherapy,in THE PLACEBO EFFECT
138, 140 (Harrington ed., 1997). Important to this is the observation that "the effectiveness of the
drug treatment and placebo treatment are related-as placebo effect increases, overall drug effect
increases, too." Moerman, supranote 58, at 58. Patients need not have extensive experience with
a medication to elicit a placebo effect; pharmacological conditioning is also possible even where
there is a delay between administration of the medication and the neutral stimuli. Siegel, supra
note 19, at 4.
117. What is known as the "sequence effect" becomes important to this discussion. Sequence
effect suggests that the placebo effect is most effective if the active medication precedes the
placebo. Several experiments have shown that the "effectiveness ofthe placebo in attenuating pain
depended on the preceding drug-the placebo elicited analgesia only when it followed an effective
analgesic." Siegel, supra note 19, at 12. In addition, however, if the placebo response is a
conditioned response, "it should be subject to extinction; the effectiveness of the placebo should
decrease over the course of repeated administrations." Id.
118. Ader, supra note 116, at 140. So, for example, researchers have found that "patients
with prior experience with immunosuppressants may acquire an immunosuppressive CR to drugassociated stimuli." See Siegel, supra note 19, at 10. Anginal patients have also been found, in
a number of studies, to display conditioned responses to placebos associated with previously-used
active drugs. Id. at II.
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adherence to the treatment protocol may increase .... The
fact that less active drug is present could also have
consequences for target organ damage .... "'
Obviously, the potential to achieve good patient outcomes with a smaller
cumulative amount of an expensive drug also offers the possibility of costsavings. 20 Of course, if conditioning theory is accurate, placebos should
produce both the benefits and side effects of a treatment to which the
patient has become accustomed.' Moreover, if the placebo fails to induce
side effects, the patient may realize that she is receiving a placebo, thereby
undermining its effects.'
Although researchers are confident that a significant proportion of
patients can respond positively to placebos offered under the proper
circumstances, they have yet to discover which patients will so respond, or
to definitively identify the proper circumstances.'23 In addition, adherents
of the conditioning theory readily acknowledge that it cannot be the sole
explanation of the placebo effect, since placebo effects on patients do not
always mimic the drug effects and placebo effects can occur without prior
drug exposure. 24 According to some, expectancy theory explains those
placebo responses not explicable by conditioning analysis. 25

119. Ader, supra note 116, at 156-57.
120. Ader explains the concept, although he does not suggest it for the utilization benefits
that I am suggesting here: "By capitalizing on conditioning effects, it might be possible to
approximate the therapeutic effects of a continuous schedule of pharmacologic reinforcement, that
is, to relieve pain or maintain some physiologic state within homeostatic limits, using lower
cumulative amounts of drug." Id. at 143.
121. Id. at 150.
122. Id. at 151. "Conditioned side effects would increase the similarity between drug and
placebo conditions and amplify placebo effects." Id. Another less understood aspect of
conditioning may lead to insights for treatment of drug addiction. The discussion thus far has
focused on placebos that mimic drugs. Other experiments suggest that, in some situations,
placebos cause the body to compensate for the drug effect. "The existence of compensatory
pharmacological CRs has implications for understanding the role of conditioning in the
phenomena of drug addiction-specifically, drug tolerance and withdrawal symptoms." Siegel,
supra note 19, at 15. Tolerance refers to the decreasing effect of drugs over the course of
administration. Tolerance increases when the drugs are administered in a regularized setting and
way-the placebo effect of the environment causes the body to anticipate and compensate for the
drugs, thereby decreasing their effectiveness. Id. Researchers suggest that this mechanism can be
employed to decrease drug lethality. Id. at 16. In addition, "[d]rug tolerance is highly correlated
with drug withdrawal symptoms. Moreover, withdrawal symptoms are compensatory responses."
Id. at 16. Thus, it is thought that withdrawal symptoms occur in response to cues that cause
anticipation of drugs. In other words, withdrawal symptoms are placebo effects. Id.
123. Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 256.
124. Siegel, supra note 19, at 17.
125. See generally id.
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b. Expectancy Theory
Expectancy theory acknowledges the possibility that a number of
variables may evoke the placebo response," 6 but proposes that the placebo
effect largely results from patient learning and interactions which suggest
what the patient might anticipate from the prescribed treatment. While
conditioning involves learning based upon past experiences (and therefore
requires prior exposure to treatment), expectancy relies upon multiple
forms of learning (which can include conditioning), such as "knowledge
about the therapeutic agent, the circumstances under which it is
administered, and the condition which is to be treated."' 27 Expectancy
2
theory hypothesizes an immediate relationship between some cognitions 1
and expectancy responses.
Changing people's expectations regarding pain, depression or anxiety
can change their experiences; "expectancy-induced changes in experience
are always accompanied by at least some physiological changes. '" 29 So,
expectancy theory hypothesizes that learning about the increased efficacy
of a new treatment can produce an expectancy of relief or cure, which can
either affect physiological functions (blood pressure, heart rate), or produce
subjective relief (amelioration of depression, avoidance of panic attack). "0
side effects, whether positive or negative,
Likewise, expecting particular
31
occurrence.'
their
evoke
can
Expectancy theory offers much potential for treating a variety of
conditions. 32 Expectancy can contribute to asthma attacks in patients who
33
are aware that certain situations or substances act as triggers.
126. See, e.g., Kirsch, supra note 60, at 174-76.
127. Donald D. Price & Howard L. Fields, The Contributionof Desire and Expectation to
Placebo Analgesia: Implicationsfor New Research Strategies, in THE PLACEBO EFFECT 123
(Harrington ed., 1997).
128. "People respond cognitively, affectively, and behaviorally to environmental events, but
through cognition they also exercise control over their own behavior, which then influences not
only the environment but also cognitive, affective, and biological states." James E. Maddux,
Expectanciesand the Social-CognitivePerspective: Basic Principles,Processes,and Variables,
in HOW EXPECTANCIES SHAPE EXPERIENCE 19 (Kirsch ed., 1999) [hereinafter EXPECTANCIES].
129. Irving Kirsch, Response Expectancy: An Introduction, in EXPECTANCIES, supra note
128, at 7.
130. Price & Fields, supra note 127, at 123; Kirsch, supra note 60, at 178-80.
131. Kirsch, supra note 60, at 176-77.
132. See, e.g., Irving Kirsch & Guy Sapirstein, Listening to Prozacbut HearingPlacebo: A
Meta-Analysis of Antidepressant Medications, in EXPECTANCIES, supra note 129, at 303
(suggesting that the response to anti-depressant medication is substantially placebo); Eileen M.
Palace, Response Expectancy and Sexual Dysfunction in Women, in EXPECTANCIES, supranote
129, at 173 (proposing employment of cognitive-physiological pathways to treat mental and
physical sexual health problems in women).
133. Samantha C. Sodergren & Michael E. Hyland, Expectancy and Asthma in
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Presumably, an understanding of this phenomenon can aid patients in selfregulating their responses to asthma triggers. In contrast, patients'
expectations about the effect of their asthma medication may enhance the
relief the patient experiences from the medication. 13 4 To illustrate, Drs.
Sodergren and Hyland have recommended that "when asthma is being
treated in the emergency room after an asthma attack, it might be helpful
to tell patients 'We are now going to give you a powerful bronchodilator,'
as this suggestion could possibly have a positive effect on outcome. '35
A better understanding of expectation offers possibilities to exploit
placebo analgesia for pain reduction.' 36 Several studies undermine the
classical conditioning theory as an explanation of placebo analgesic,' 37
although conditioning "may lead to the acquisition of expectancies."' 38
Thus, according to Dr. Kirsch, although prior exposure to treatment is not
necessary to the placebo effect, it can certainly enhance it.'39
3. Third Level Explanations
Mediational theories comprise the third level explanations. Some argue
that the placebo effect is primarily psychological, as opposed to
biological. 41 Others advocate that the placebo response is more likely a
psychophysiological response
that includes cognitive-verbal and
14
physiochemical responses. 1
The cognitive-verbal theory suggests the occurrence of conscious and
sub-conscious processing of cognitive and emotional information in such
a way that it operates safety signals which can, for example, reduce anxiety
or generate hope. 142 So, the theory suggests, neutral stimuli associated with
illness or treatment, such as seeing the doctor, or receiving a prescription,
EXPECTANCIES, supra note 128, at 210.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See generally Donald D. Price & James J. Barrell, Expectationand Desire in Painand
PainReduction, in EXPECTANCIES supra note 128, at 145.
137. See id. at 154. Likewise, one of the biggest challenges to expectancy theory is whether
its observations are really supportive of conditioning theory. See Price & Fields, supra note 127,
at 124. But see Kirsch, supra note 60, at 173-74 (discussing experiment in which subjects'
response to conditioning stimulus was ameliorated by advising subjects of manipulation, which,
Kirsch claims, supports expectancy theory).
138. Kirsch, supra note 60, at 155.
139. Id. at 156, 175.
140. William B. Potkin, A PsychologicalApproachto Placebo: The Role ofFaithin Therapy
and Treatment, in PLACEBO, supra note 1, at 237, 238.
141. See Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 266-67.
142. See Bootzin, supra note 64, at 200-01 (discussing various theories relating cognitive
and/or expectancy theories to Pavlovian conditioning). Conditioning theory relies on covert stimuli
to elicit a response from the subject, whereas cognitive theory assumes that the subject's reactions
are centrally controlled. Id.
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which patients associate with imminent relief, can themselves operate to
produce relief' 43
The physiochemical aspect of the placebo effect arguably encompasses
psychoneuroendocrine and psychoneuroimmunological components. First,
it "appears that there are descending pain inhibitory pathways from the
medial brain stem to the dorsal horn ofthe spinal cord."' 44 These pathways
involve opiate and non-opiate mechanisms which can be activated by
endorphins and electrical stimulation. 145 The theory suggests, then, that
stimulation of endorphins may be instrumental in
46 achieving placebo
analgesic effect as well as reduction in depression.
It is also now thought that the central nervous system can alter the
associated with
immune system, which suggests that Pavlovian conditioning
4
immunocompetence.
influence
may
effect
the placebo
III. THE DANISH VIEW-THE PLACEBO EFFECT IS A CHIMERA
Since the publication of Beecher's 1955 classic article, The Powerful
Placebo, there has been little dissent from the orthodoxy proclaiming the
existence of the placebo effect. The first crack in this artifice appeared in
the mid-1990s, when two German researchers, Drs. Kienle and Kiene,
published scathing critiques of Beecher's article, as well as all literature
supporting the existence of the placebo effect.148 This study was met with
a rather muted response. In 2001, however, Drs. Asbjorn Hrobjartsson and
Pete C. Gotzsche published a very thoughtful study raising serious
questions about the placebo effect that has generated significant
discussion.'49
Drs. Kienle and Kiene enumerated several categories of methodological
errors committed by Beecher and subsequent researchers looking for the
placebo effect. 50 They cite studies in which they claim that researchers
attributed spontaneous improvement or fluctuation of symptoms to
placebos; failed to account for regression to the mean;15' observed placebo
effects where patients were receiving placebos in addition to some other
therapy, 52 or no placebo at all; 53 relied upon patient self-reports of

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 266-67.
Id. at 267.
Id.
Id. at268.
Id.
Kienle & Kiene, supra note 34; Kienle & Kiene. supra note 7.
See generally Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche. supra note 7.
Kienle & Kiene, supra note 7,at 1311.
Kienle & Kiene, supra note 34, at 45.
Kienle & Kiene, supra note 7. at 1313.
Id. at 1315.
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improvement that should be discounted or ignored due to "experimental
subordination"'5 4 or psychotic misjudgment; 55 or, in the case of metaanalysis, misquoted other studies' conclusions.'56
Endemic to any study disputing the existence of the placebo effect is
disagreement about the definition of placebo. Both sets of researchers
define away some of the most significant examples ofplacebos. Kienle and
Kiene,' as well as the Danish study,'58 distinguish between the effects of
the therapeutic relationship and the placebo effect. As discussed earlier in
this Article, the therapeutic relationship is thought by many to be essential
to many placebo opportunities. Similarly, Kienle and Kiene suggest that
sham surgery can have a specific effect, and therefore cannot be considered
placebo.' 59 This distinction exploits the confusion about what "specific
effect" encompasses, and whether a placebo effect should be considered the
specific effect of a placebo once it is reliably identified and its mechanism
is understood. Finally, Kienle and Kiene distinguish between psychosomatic
effects, which they believe are potentially significant, and placebo effects,
which they believe are not. 616 IOthers would consider these phenomena to
be categorically equivalent.
154. Id. at 1314 (experimental subordination refers to the phenomenon whereby the subject
of an experiment "says what he thinks he is expected to say, rather than what he really observes
or experiences").
155. Id. at 1315.
156. Id. at 1316.
157. Kienle & Kiene, supra note 34, at 40 (rejecting conceptualization of effects of
therapeutic relationship as nonspecific or placebo).
158. Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7, at 1599 (acknowledging that they did not study
the effect of the patient-provider relationship which, in their view, may be independent of placebo
effect).
159. Kienle & Kiene, supra note 34, at 45.
160. Id. at 50.
161. David Kernick et al., Context andHealth Outcomes, 357 LANCET 2059 (June 23, 2001)
(discussing a report on a systematic review of studies focusing on the effects of doctor-patient
interactions on treatment results); van Weel, supra note 85 (stating that "bedside manners, the
warmth of the doctor-patient relationship and other features of good doctoring contribute to the
outcome of medical care, yet they have been treated contemptuously by the biomedical community
as factors that produce placebo (or context, or non-specific) effects that should not work even if
they do"); Di Blasi et al., supra note 85, at 757 (describing a comprehensive search for objective
studies on the effects, if any, a doctor's emotional support and establishing of expectations might
have on the patient's recovery and concluding that an attitude of reassurance and friendly manner
seems to be more effective than a formal attitude when treating patients); Turner et al., supra note
18 (commenting on a systematic review on pain and the placebo effect which concluded that "the
quality of the interaction between physician and patient can be extremely influential in patient
outcomes, and . . . patient and provider expectations may be more important than specific
treatments"); Anne D. Walling, PlacebosandPlaceboEffect, 62 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 658 (2000)
(noting that the placebo effect can be enhanced by strongly positive physician-patient
relationships); Brody, supra note 69 (commenting that "the placebo response is commonly invoked
as a factor in the therapeutic relationship between the family physician and the patient"); Herbert
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Further, Kienle and Kiene reject conditioning theory as an explanation
of placebo effect, stating that "clinical experience contradicts the
assumption that health canbe conditioned."162 To support their proposition,
Kienle and Kiene note that "[r]ecurrent or chronic disorders (recurrent
infections, tumor recurrence, recurrent ulcers, chronic osteomyelitis, etc.)
are more difficult to treat than first occurrences."' 63 The authors' overview
of the conditioning literature, however, is inadequate to support their point.
In addition, conditioning theorists themselves admit that conditioning is not
a complete explanation of the placebo effect, and concede that in some
areas, conditioning studies have produced mixed outcomes. 164 Ultimately,
Kienle and Kiene seem to acknowledge that their quibble may be largely
definitional, as they acknowledge the "possibility that the patient's selfhealing powers may be influenced by a wide variety of non-pharmacological
approaches."' 65 In sum, then, Kienle and Kiene's work is not fully
pursuasive, and further study is surely required.
Is the PlaceboPowerless?," co-authored by Asbjorn Hrobjartsson and
Peter C. Gotzsche and published in 2001, is a careful meta-analysis 67 that
deserves much more attention. The article questions the extent of reliable
research 6 ' that exists about the placebo effect (preferably three arm studies
with treatment, placebo and no treatment groups), 6 9 and concludes that in

Benson, Commentary: Self-Care, the Three-Legged Stool, and Remembered Wellness, 10 J.
CARDIOVASCULARNURSING 1 (1996) (explaining that three factors contribute to a positive placebo
effect: "(1) The positive beliefs and expectations on the part of the health care professional, (2)
the positive beliefs and expectations on the part of the patient, and (3) the beliefs evoked by a
good relationship between the two parties.").
162. Kienle & Kiene, supra note 7, at 1314 (emphasis added). "Clinical experience" seems
to be a euphemism for anecdote, which is not generally perceived to be a sufficient basis for
reaching conclusions in scientific discourse.
163. Kienle & Kiene, supranote 34, at 49. Without discussing extinction, which conditioning
theorists acknowledge as a phenomenon, Kienle and Kiene rely upon the dissipation of the
placebo effect with the passage of time as evidence that the placebo effect is not real. Kienle &
Kiene, supra note 7, at 1314.
164. Kienle & Kiene, supra note 7. This section of the article would have also benefitted
from a discussion of extinction and sequencing.
165. Kienle & Kiene, supra note 34, at 51.
166. Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7.
167. Brody and Weismantel point out that Hrobjartsson and Gotzsche have extended metaanalysis methodology beyond its usual parameters by combining studies that have not necessarily
employed "similar protocols, interventions, and outcome measurements." Howard Brody & David
Weismantel, A Challenge to Core Beliefs, 17 ADVANCES IN MIND-BODY MED. 6, 7 (2001).
168. Hrobjartsson and Gotzsche observe that most placebo studies fail to control for
regression to the mean and natural history of the disease. Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note
7, at 1594; see also Brody & Weismantel, supra note 167, at 6.
169. Howard Brody and David Weismantel note that"[t]here may be other control conditions,
such as having multiple placebo groups, or the hidden administration of an "active" medication,
which would serve as well as a no-treatment comparison." Brody & Weismantel, supra note 167,
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those that exist, they do not generally support the existence of a placebo
effect. An important exception exists with respect to pain, where twentyseven trials did indeed show a significant placebo effect as compared to no
treatment.7 ' This conclusion might be more broadly stated to indicate that
the authors' research observes placebo effect for subjective but not
objective outcomes. 7 '
Several caveats exist. 72 The researchers did not include within their
conception of "placebo" the physician-patient relationship, 73
' about which
many studies exist supporting the proposition of a placebo effect. More
specifically however, is how many independent studies existed for each
placebo scenario studied. 74 Additionally, the studies seem to have been
categorized according to condition studied (obesity, smoking)," rather
than form ofplacebo (pill, counseling, sham surgery).' 76 As such, one could
imagine that placebo pills studied in the treatment of asthma do not work,
but that some other placebo, inhaling an innocuous herbal substance, for
example, might.

at7.

170. Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7, at 1596.
171. See Brody & Weismantel, supra note 167, at 6 (who also note that this conclusion
contradicts much recent research about mind-body interactions).
172. The researchers themselves suggest several possible biases in their conclusions:
subjective outcomes were not subject to blind evaluation; studies did not control for untreated
patients seeking treatment outside of the trial, which would reduce evidence of placebo effect;
questions exist about the quality of methodology in small trials which reported larger placebo
effects. Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7, at 1597-99.
173. Id. at 1599.

174. In those studies involving binary outcomes, nausea, relapse after the cessation of
smoking, and depression had been subjected to at least three independent studies. Id. at 1596. For
continuous outcomes, pain, obesity, asthma, hypertension, insomnia, and anxiety were each the
subject of at least three independent studies. Id. at 1596; see also Brody & Weismantel, supra
note 167, at 7 (noting that very few studies were found for any particular condition, and that
"adding relatively few more studies to any of those sub-analyses could have greatly changed the
outcome").
175. The trials investigated forty clinical conditions: hypertension, asthma, anemia,
hyperglycemia, hypercholesterolemia, seasickness, Raynaud's disease, alcohol abuse, smoking,
obesity, poor oral hygiene, herpes simplex infection, bacterial infection, common cold, pain,
nausea, ileus, infertility, cervical dilation, labor, menopause, prostatism, depression,
schizophrenia, insomnia, anxiety, phobia, compulsive nail biting, mental handicap, marital
discord, stress related to dental treatment, orgasmic difficulties, fecal soiling, enuresis, epilepsy
Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease, attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder, carpal tunnel
syndrome, and undiagnosed ailments. Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7, at 1596.
176. The typical pharmacological placebo was a lactose tablet. The typical physical placebo
was a procedure performed with a machine that was turned off (e.g., sham transcutaneous
electrical nerve stimulation). The typical psychological placebo was a nondirectional, neutral
discussion between the patient and the treatment provider, referred to as an "attention placebo."
Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7, at 1596.
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Alternatively, the studies considered might not sufficiently consider
placebo trials designed to test the variety of competing theories, such as
conditioning, expectancy and cognitive learning. Obviously, there may be
an insufficient number of trials of any particular placebo that tests each
hypothesis ofthe placebo mechanism for each ofthe specific conditions for
which placebos are thought to be possibly relevant. This suggests, of
course, that much additional research is required. As evidenced in part by
the Danish study, researchers have yet to agree on a number of other
questions necessary to pursue research in this area. 177 What outcomes are
to be measured, and a definition of health, continue to elude agreement in
studying this area. The Danish study authors note that few studies reported
on quality-of-life or patient well-being, 171 which are, of course, areas where
significant claims of success are made by many placebo theorists.
Obviously, these questions require resolution before any particular legal
or ethical conclusions are reached. If it is concluded, however, that
placebos (or at least some form of placebos) produce no beneficial effect
for their patients, then many contemporary medical practices must be
modified. First, some justify and encourage continued use of unproven
CAM therapies for their presumed placebo effect. If no such therapeutic
benefit actually exists, then no medical or ethical justification exists to
support the continued prescription of no-benefit treatments. Further, one
would have to wonder over the public policy choice to continue licensing
practitioners whose primary or sole techniques are likely to be nothing
more than placebo which, we would have established, is worthless. State
agencies responsible for enforcing consumer fraud laws might have good
reason to begin prosecuting purveyors of alternative modalities that have
no proven medical benefit. More specifically, physicians who engage in
alternative practices, or consciously misprescribe active treatments for their
placebo effect, should find that such practices run afoul of their state
licensing laws, exposing them to sanctions.
Establishing the complete non-existence of a placebo effect would
dramatically affect certain areas of conventional medical practice, including
much mental health treatment, and pain management. A rejection of the
placebo effect could well require rejection of much of these disciplines,
leaving many patients without hope.

177. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
178. Hrobjartsson & Gotzsche, supra note 7, at 1599.
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IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND OBSTACLES: WHAT IF A POWERFUL

PLACEBO REALLY EXISTS?

A. Opportunities
Placebo research is currently at its apex, with the NIH funding myriad
studies to explore the phenomenon. Should the research yield a conclusion
that the placebo effect truly exists, with an understanding of how and on
whom it works, and with a predictive sense of its power, the implications
on medicine and health care would be enormous. Frederick Evans suggests
that placebo therapy might be useful where the most appropriate drug for
a patient is contraindicated or is working too slowly. 79 A placebo might aid
the drug addict during withdrawal or the chronically ill patient for whom a
drug is no longer safe or necessary.' But, says Evans,

[t]he most important single use of placebo,

. . . is
diagnostic,.., positive response to placebo not only indicates
that, for the [pain] patient, expectancy and hope for further
success in therapy is realistic; for the therapist, it indicates that
the patient, at some cognitive level, has the resources to be
able to influence, modulate,
and control his or her pain (or
81
other symptom)."'

Initially, then, those with the most to gain are patients whose pain remains
unresolved by conventional treatment methods.
Even those researchers who are generally skeptical of the existence of
a placebo effect have concluded that placebos are likely effective in pain
management, particularly with chronic pain. 182 Two lessons already appear
to be emerging--one focused on the placebo benefits lost when chronic
pain patients are inappropriately treated or given placebos, and the other
geared towards effective use of placebos with patients in pain. Many
chronic pain patients experience serial disappointments with the health care
system. Unable to diagnose the cause of their pain, some physicians
haphazardly prescribe ineffective treatments (active placebos) as a means
to pacify these patients, while other physicians decide that patients with
persistent pain of unknown etiology are somatizing, and give them inert
placebos. 83 The patient's positive response confirms the physician's

179. Evans, supra note 1, at 225.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 261. Chronic pain patients refer to those whose pain has not been successfully
treated. See Peck & Coleman, supranote 37, at 262-63.
183. It has been suggested that chronic pain patients are the most frequent recipients of pure
placebos. Peck & Coleman, supra note 37, at 262.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/2

32

Boozang: The Therapeutic Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception

THERAPEUTIC PIACEBO

suspicion that the patient was not sick. This conclusion, of course, reveals
the physician's misunderstanding of the placebo effect,'8 and exposes the
patient to a continued course of inappropriate care.
The patient who does not improve has been set up, or conditioned, to
expect future failures from medicine. Such conditioning increases the
probability that she will experience "placebo sag," or extinction of the
placebo response associated with future treatments (whether placebo or
nonplacebo). s5 Alternatively, an unsuccessful experience with a placebo

may cause a chronic pain patient to believe that her medical problem is

more serious than it may actually be, thereby increasing her anxiety.'86 In

sum, one conclusion that can be drawn from current understanding of the
placebo effect is that physicians can diminish patients' opportunities for
successful future medical care by misusing placebos.
Of equal interest and importance is the potential offered by
"appropriate" placebo treatment, or enhancement ofthe placebo component
of nonplacebo treatment. Numerous studies have shown that a significant
percentage of patients experience a substantial (at least half) reduction of
18 7
severe clinical pain with the introduction of an inert substance or drug.
B. Obstacles: The Prohibitionon Lying
The major barrier to physicians unabashedly passing placebos out to
their patients has been the assumption that it requires lying,' and that

physicians should not lie to their patients.8 9 The essential thrust of the

184. Research has confidently established that "a placebo response is not due to some
psychological pathology in the patient and does not indicate the absence of organic pathology."
Id.
185. Id. at 261.
186. Id. at 262; Turner et al., supra note 18, at 1613.
187. See Wickramasekera, supra note 57, at 255 (claiming that approximately 35% patients
experience this drop off in pain). Studies also show stunningly high patient satisfaction and
success rates with treatments later found not to be efficacious. See Turner et al., supra note 18,
at 1610; see also de Saintonge & Herxheimer, supra note 77, at 995 ("Good or excellent relief of
pain has been obtained in about 70% of patients by procedures later shown to have no specific
effects .... "). Patients have also been quite satisfied with sham treatments. "For example, 64%
of patients who underwent a sham tooth-grinding procedure for myofascial pain dysfunction
(Temporomandibular disorder) reported total or near-total symptom remission." Turner et al.,
supranote 18, at 1610 (citing Goodman, Green et al., Response ofPatientswith Myofascial Paindysfunction Syndrome to Mock Equilibration,92 J. AM. DENT. AsSOC. 755, 755-78 (1976)). See
generally David J. Rowbotham, Endogenous Opioids,PlaceboResponse, andPain,357 LANCET
1901 (2001).
188. See generally Howard Brody, The Lie that Heals: The Ethics of Giving Placebos, 97
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 112, 117 (1982).
189. There are many fine resources on the philosophy of lying, providing overviews on the
myriad philosophical positions on the prohibition against lying, and when exceptions to the
prohibition might exist. I will not reprise those here. See generallyAnita Allen, Lying to Protect
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objection is that lying undermines patients' exercise of their autonomy by
interfering with their ability to engage in informed decisionmaking 90
Interestingly, even while balking at patient deception, most ethical literature
reserves the right to lie under necessary circumstances, including, in the
medical context, the administration of placebos. 9 '
An application of the precepts about lying in the therapeutic placebo
context requires consideration of two fundamental questions. First, is
deception in fact necessary to effective use of placebos? Second, do the
benefits of therapeutic placebosjustify an exception to the maxim against
patient deception? The first is a fact question; the second, an ethical and
legal dilemma.
1. Is Deception Necessary to Placebo Use?
Researchers disagree about whether deception is necessary to the
effective use of placebos, with the traditional assumption being that it is
necessary. This part begins by exploring the validity of that starting point.
There are several contexts in which placebos can be used without
misleading the patient in any way. For example, patient deception is absent
from many of the placebo scenarios contemplated by the "meaning
model." 92' In its most basic iteration, which encourages a positive
physician-patient relationship and the performance of rituals that are
important to the patient in the treatment setting, deception is absent from
the placebo experience. Clearly, the physician who hangs her diplomas on
the wall, wears a white coat, and takes a thorough patient history, is
adhering to American customs associated with providing good medical
care, which also causes the placebo effect, according to "meaning model"
adherents.

Privacy, 44 VILL. L. REV. 161, 167-69 (1999) (surveying Catholic theological tradition, and the
concept of"mental reservation," Kant, and contemporary philosophers, who "have argued that the
wrongness of lying is to some extent contingent upon the circumstances"); SISSELA BOK, LYING
33-56 (3rd ed., 1999) (surveying Augustine and Kant, both of whom are generally interpreted as
absolute prohibitionists, as well as a variety of religious scholars and utilitarianism); CHARLES
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 60 (1978) (explicating Kant and Augustine's views that lying is always
wrong; Kant argued that "lying undermines confidence and trust among men generally," and is
a "perversion of one's uniquely human capacities irrespective of any consequences of the lie, and
thus lying is not only intrinsically bad but wrong"); Marshall B. Kapp, Placebo Therapy and the
Law: Prescribewith Care, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 371. 376-77 (1983) (surveying deontological and
utilitarian views on deception), Mark C. Murphy. NaturalLaw and the Moral Absohte Against
Lyintg, 41 AM. J. JURiS. 81 (1996) (critiquing Finis" natural law analysis of the prohibition against
lying, and, while agreeing with the conclusion, offering an alternative analysis).
190. See generally Kapp, supranote 189. at 391-94: Alan Strudler, Incommensurable Goods.
Rightfid Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud. 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1529. 1546-51 (1998).
191. BOK. supra note 189, at 61-68: Kapp. supra note 189. at 382-85.
192. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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Likewise, deceit is wholly absent when a healer recommends a treatment
that both treater and patient believe is efficacious, but whose sole power is
subsequently understood to have been the placebo effect. 93 Today, this is
most frequently assumed to be true in the case of unproven CAM
modalities, which alternative providers, and some physicians and nurses,
sincerely believe are effective treatments.'94 If CAM interventions are
regularly observed to help patients, and the provider has no reason not to
believe that the intervention works, then the provider cannot be deceiving
the patient. It is only when the provider learns that the modality has been
disproven by a reliable study, that she will be faced with an ethical dilemma
about its continued use.'9 5 Interestingly, this might suggest that for those
CAM modalities that are harmless,'96 and whose effectiveness is probably
attributable to the placebo effect, it wouldbe counterproductive to conduct
research to establish that the treatment has no specific effect. 197 Publication
of such data might undermine the placebo effect.
The research supporting the meaning model encourages physicians to
be confident and positive, even when unsure of the patient's diagnosis.'98
This self-confidence is thought to contribute to the placebo effect, whereas
expressions of doubt or uncertainty are thought to contribute to longer
recovery, and return visits to the doctor's office.

193. What Grunbaum refers to as the "unwitting" use of the placebo. See supra notes 46 and
accompanying text.
194. Dr. Brody's definition of placebo contemplates this scenario, where, a treatment is
believed to be efficacious at the time rendered, and does indeed help the patient, but only later is
found to be ineffective. See Brody, supra note 188, at 113.
195. See, e.g., de Saintonge & Herxheimer, supra note 77, at 991:
Improve publicity about successes, and suppress publicity about complaints.
Better publicity about medical successes should increase expectations of
benefit .... Suppression of publicity about complaints may be beneficial because
the effectiveness of a doctor will be reduced by anything that undermines faith.
Journalists usually assume that the publicity given to medical accidents will, on
balance, benefit the health of the public, but it may in fact cause considerable
worsening.
Id. Further, under the current informed consent regime, definitive data that therapeutic effect is
limited to placebo effect might preclude providers from continuing to use a CAM modality that
had been providing a benefit to patients.
196. Assuming that the patient is not foregoing known efficacious treatmentsthat are curative
or ameliorative.
197. The decision could be made either not to conduct the research at all or, to ensure that
placebo and no treatment arms are included, to establish placebo effect.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 85-98; see also de Saintonge & Herxheimer, supra
note 77, at 997 who advise: "Make sure the patient sees no reason for doubting the effectiveness
of treatment."
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A final example that could be unproblematic, but nonetheless might
suggest something akin to deceit, arises when a clinician withholds from her
patient the true nature of his condition. This dilemma confronts the
rehabilitative specialist who meets the stroke patient whom she knows will
never recover use ofhis arm, though he will likely walk again, with physical
therapy, a brace, and a cane. 99
' The meaning model suggests that physicians
can instigate the placebo effect by putting the most positive spin on
prognostic information. In many instances, this can be done truthfully; but
sometimes it cannot. In the words of a stroke patient's treating physician:
"Having reviewed the data and examined him, I know he is unlikely to
recover much use of his arm. I couch my answer carefully, full of caveats
and uncertainty that I do not completely feel."2 "0 In such instances, the lines
separating hope, concealment and outright deceit become much more
difficult to negotiate.
Taken to its full potential, the meaning model unquestionably
encourages physician deception. Research suggests, for example, that
patients are more likely to experience the placebo effect if they receive
some kind of treatment instruction or prescription. This poses no problem
if the patient is satisfied with a recommendation for sleep, exercise and
proper diet. But some patients are not satisfied with such quotidian
disposition, and demand something more. A prescription for a placebo,
whether pure or impure,201 constitutes a deception, even if the physician
believes that the placebo will benefit the patient.0 2
Proponents of the conditioning theory, who would intersperse an active
drug with a placebo in order to lower dosages and side-effects, 3 suggest
that maximum effect is obtained by deceiving not only the patient, but also
the clinician treating the patient.2°4 Frederick Evans explains:
[I]t appears that when the patient as well as the physician
believe that a powerful drug is being used, a strong placebo
199. Joel Stein, A FragileCommodity, 283 JAMA 305, 305 (2000).
200. Id.
201. The prescription for a pure placebo would contain no active ingredients; the impure
placebo, would comprise a misapplied active medication (e.g., an antibiotic for a virus). In either
case, the physician is engaged in a deception--she is representing to the patient that she is
receiving a medication designed to affect a cure-in the case of the pure placebo, she is receiving
no medication, and in the case of the impure placebo, she is not receiving a medication designed
to cure what ails her. While in practice physicians continue to this day to prescribe impure
placebos, in writing they universally deplore the practice. See, e.g., Alan Leslie, Ethics and
Practiceof Placebo Therapy, AM. J.MED. 854, 856 (1954) (stating that "[i]t is poor practice for
the physician to prescribe an impure placebo").
202. See infra text accompanying note 227.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
204. Evans, supra note I, at 224. Research indicates that in addition to lying to patients,
physicians lie to each other.
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effect is obtained in a double-blind administration. If, however,
it is assumed that the medication is less effective, a much
smaller placebo effect is obtained, even though it is still
proportionately about half as effective as the actual analgesic.
The conviction of the therapist about the drug's
potency-which presumably communicates itself to the
hopeful patient in terms ofthe plausibility and expectation that
it will work, and the consequent reduction of anxiety-seems
to be a powerful mediator of therapeutic effectiveness. 0 5
Such an approach maximizes the clinician's ability to convey enthusiasm
and hope about the expected benefits of the therapeutic placebo. 0 6 So, the
suggestion is that neither the patient nor the nurse actually administering
treatment to the patient would be able to distinguish between drug and
placebo."0 7 Presumably, the patient will have every reason to believe that
she is receiving an analgesic with each administration, which is, of course,
what is intended she believe.
Although deception may be desirable to achieve the best results, the
question researchers must answer is whether such deception is necessary.
If it is not, many argue that the most ethically and legally correct resolution
to the placebo dilemma is that physicians obtain patient consent to
administer a placebo.
In this scenario, the physician should clearly explain to the patient that
there is no biochemical reason for the placebo to work, but that scientific
studies have shown that inert substances or otherwise ineffective treatments
may psychologically benefit the patient. "This obligation to disclose should
not be altered because the patient might therefore refuse this mode of
therapy or208because the placebo's effectiveness might decrease
somewhat.1

205. Id. (Evans is a proponent of the expectancy theory of the placebo effect).
206. Id. This is generally the procedure followed in a double-blind trial.
207. See Thomas B. Freeman et al., Use of Placebo Surgery in Controlled Trials of a
Cellular-BasedTherapyfor Parkinson'sDisease, 341 NEw ENG. J.MED. 988, 988 (1999). In
order to determine the effectiveness and safety of fetal-tissue transplantation in Parkinson's
disease patients, a double-blind, placebo-controlled study was performed. Id. This study was
designed to control for placebo effects, effects of patient selection, treatment, and evaluator bias.
Id. at 989. In order to account for the blinding of investigators, the surgical and evaluation sites
were assigned separate locations. Id. at 990. The surgeon was the only research team member
aware of an individual subject's group assignment. Id. In addition, all surgical records were kept
in a locked cabinet, and all of the communications between the surgeons and subjects or
investigators followed a standardized script. Id.
208. Kapp, supra note 189, at 402 (citing BENARD HARING, ETHICs OF MANIPULATION:
ISSUES IN MEDICINE, BEHAVIOR CONTROL AND GENETICS 89 (1975)).
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Professor Kapp rejects the notion that physicians will subscribe to this
approach, and he is probably correct.0 9 The physician who believes that
placebo treatment is appropriate for her patient is unlikely to risk either
undermining the placebo effect or rejecting placebo therapy by disclosing
the truth to her patient. So, although there are at least some uses of
placebos for which deception is unnecessary, particularly in the primary
care setting, it remains an open question whether deception can be
somehow excused or justified in those instances where it appears
therapeutically necessary.
2. Making the Case for Physician Deception of Patients
a. What Is a Lie?
Everyone lies.2" ° Parents lie to their children when they tell them about
Santa Claus, the Tooth Fairy and the Easter Bunny; lawyers lie to opposing
counsel during negotiations,"' and to clients about the status of their
work;212 police lie to extract confessions;"' United States Presidents lie
about a lot of things. 14
Doctors lie, too. They lie to obtain insurance coverage for their
patients,1 5 they lie to protect their patients from family discord or
humiliation; 216 they conceal medical errors from patients and their
families; 217 they hide medication in mentally disabled patients' food;" 8 they

209. Kapp, supra note 189, at 403.
210. See generallyAllen, supra note 189, at 175.
211. See generallyAlan Strudler, MoralComplexity in the Law ofNondisclosure, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 337, 337 (1997); Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics ofLying in Negotiations,75 IOWA L. REV.
1219, 1220 (1990).
212. See generally Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 661, 662 (1990).
213. See generally Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations,28
CONN. L. REV. 425, 425-26 (1996).
214. See generally Allen, supra note 189; BOK, supra note 189.
215. See generally Gregg M. Bloche, Fidelity andDeceit at the Bedside, 283 JAMA 1881,
1882 (2000); Victor Freeman et al., Lyingfor Patients, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2263,2263
(1999); Dennis H. Novak et al., Physicians' Attitudes Toward Using Deception to Resolve
Difficult Ethical Problems,261 JAMA 2980, 2980 (1989).
216. See generally Novak, supra note 215.
217. Id.
218. Adrian Treloar et al., ConcealingMedication in Patients' Food, 357 LANCET 62, 62
(2000).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol54/iss4/2

38

Boozang: The Therapeutic Placebo: The Case for Patient Deception

2002l

THERAPEUTICPLACEBO

725

lie to each other;219 they withhold information about research; 220they
conceal from terminally ill patients that they are going to die; 2 and they
give placebos to patients.222 Some of these lies are motivated by selfinterest.22 But many of the deceptions and lies of physicians to their
patients are benevolent?2 4-- they are not designed to obtain a benefit against
an adversary, or to cheat; they are intended to help the patient. 225 The
question then becomes whether the benevolent lie, in this case to evoke the
placebo effect in a patient, is unethical. To resolve this question, we must
first sort out what counts as a lie versus deception, whether the difference
matters, and whether deception may be ethically permissible.

219. Kevin F. Foley, PhysicianAdvocacy andDoctorDeception:A Double-EdgedAttack on
Due Process,FED. LAW. July 2001, at 24,27 ("Many physicians-in-training admit that they have
covered up mistakes in medical records and lied to attending physicians about things that they had
neglected to do.").
220. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990).
221. See Eric J. Cassell, The Principles of the Belmont Report Revisited, 30 HASTINGS
CENTER. REP. 12, 16-17 (July 2000) (explaining that until the 1970s, physicians often failed to
disclose the truth to patients with life-threatening diseases); Denise Ann Dickerson, A Doctor's
Duty to Disclose Life Expectancy Informationto Terminally Ill Patients,43 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
319,321 (1995) (commenting that"[h]ealth care professionals are sometimes reluctant to disclose
diagnoses and prognoses to dying patients"). Elizabeth B. Lemont & Nicholas A. Christakis,
PrognasticDisclosureto Patientswith CancerNear the End ofLife, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
1096, 1102 (2001); Peter A. Ubel, Truth in the Most Optimistic Way, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 1142-43 (2001).
222. See, e.g., Union County v. Hughes, 2001 WL 56441 at *2 (Ark. App. Jan. 24, 2001)
(recounting that "appellee was in significant pain when she concluded Dr. Safman's 30-day
inpatient program in June 1998 because Dr. Safman had replaced all of her pain medication with
placebos"); Freeman v. Luppes Transp. Co., 227 N.W.2d 143, 145 (Iowa 1975) (recounting
recommendations of physicians in treatment of anxiety to include "exercises for placebo effect");
State v. Barry, 533 P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Kan. 1975) (stating that "[hie was not in need of
treatment, but the doctor directed the injection of a placebo-consisting of a pure saline
solution-to alleviate the emotional condition"); Helton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1994 WL
901471, at *1 (Tenn. Jun. 6, 1994) (recounting that "the plaintiff was given two series of
injections for the pain. The first series of injections were epidural blocks. The second set of
injections were placebos."). See also Alex Silberman, It's All in Your Head and That's the Good
News, VEGETARIAN TIMES 72, 73 (June 2000); Walter A. Brown, The Best Medicine?, 30
PSYCHOL. TODAY 56 (Sept./Oct.,1997); McCaffery et al., Pain and Placebos: Ethical and
Professional Issues, 16 ORTHOPAEDIC NURSING 61 (May/Juhe 1997); Margaret Talbot, The
PlaceboPrescription,N.Y. TiMES, Jan. 9, 2000, at 34, 36.
223. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.
224. The term "benevolent lie" is borrowed from J.A. Barnes, who adopts the term "to refer
specifically to lies in which the liar merely intends to enhance the dupe's interests by deceiving
him or her... the liar has no intention to harm a third party." J.A. BARNES, A PACK OF LIES:
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGY OF LYING

14 (1994). Barnes distinguishes "malicious lies" which are

"told with the intention of benefiting the liar at the expense of the dupe." It
225. Paul Ekman, Why Don't We Catch Liars,63 Soc. RES. 801, 810 (1996).
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We must first distinguish the lie from deception. Deception is an
umbrella category into which lying falls as a specific type.226 Most agree
that one may deceive without lying, 7 but, because of the varying
definitions of what it means to "lie," the line between deception and lying
is unclear. Nonetheless, deceit certainly entails the intentional
communication of a message "meant to mislead them, meant to make them
believe what we ourselves do not believe." '2 8 Nonetheless, it is implicit in
the literature that lying is worse than other forms of deception, though not
always for reasons that are clear.
The definitions of lying fall across a spectrum, eventually merging
conceptually with deception generally; obviously, the choice of a narrow
conception of lying is one way to eliminate many of the obstacles presented
by a prohibition on lying. A narrow definition is also analytically
efficient-it precludes the necessity of considering whether a lie is, under
the circumstances, justifiable or excusable. One author who takes the
narrowest approach to lying is Sissella Bok.229
Bok's book, Lying. Moral Choice in PublicandPrivateLife, requires
intent to mislead23 and an actual false statement.23 ' This definition allows
one to deceive without lying, and to avoid lying by not speaking. Other
definitions of lying are difficult to distinguish from deceit. Gerald
Wetlaufer, a legal commentator, defines lying to include "all means by
which one might attempt to create in some audience a belief at variance
with one's own." 2 This definition does not require an actual statement,233
and also avoids the necessity of ascertaining the truth or falsity of the
understanding at issue.' Notably, neither definition would seem to require
a physician to dispel a patient's misunderstanding-the prohibition is on the
creationof a misconception.
Paul Ekman also goes beyond "the statement" upon which Bok's
definition hinges.2 35 Ekman asserts that "one can falsify without words, and
one need not falsify, verbally or nonverbally, to lie. Concealment is just as

226. BOK, supranote 189, at 14.
227. BARNES, supra note 224, at 17.
228. BOK, supranote 189, at 13.
229. See infranotes 230-34 and accompanying text.
230. BOK, supra note 189, at 7-8; see also Ekman, supra note 225, at 801.
231. BOK, supra note 189, at 13. Lying, she declares, is a subset of deception which, while
clearly not a good thing, is not the subject of her book. Id.at 13-14.
232. Wetlaufer, supra note 211, at 1223.
233. See FRIED, supranote 189, at 57 (Fried's definition of lying uses the word "assertion,"
which, he concludes, means that someone can lie without using words. "Surely, if a person nods
assent to a proposition, this should stand as an assertion of the truth of that proposition. Under
appropriate circumstances, even remaining silent may constitute an assertion.").
234. Wetlaufer, supra note 211, at 1224.
235. Ekman, supranote 225, at 803.
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much a lie as falsification, if there is an expectation that information will be
revealed." 6 The fulcrum'for Ekman is motive; concealment and falsification are merely alternative techniques to accomplish the same thing,
which is to mislead. 7 Ekman's approach might require a physician to
clarify a patient's misconception, even if the physician did not create the
patient's misunderstanding, as long as the physician believed that the patient
relied upon the physician to resolve her misunderstandings. Even with this
definition, there is a loophole: the subjective element of his definition-is
there an expectation that the information will be revealed?
Those who focus on "escape routes" approach the definition of lying as
"strict constructionists."23" Mary Mothersill, for example, enumerates some
of the several ways one can mislead without actually having to lie:
"[e]quivocation, hyperbole, irony, unspoken qualifications," value
judgments and "lawlike generalizations. " 23 9 Even Bok, while certainly not
subscribing to this last approach, acknowledges that the expectation of
truthtelling does not require "truthdumping"--the choice, she explains,
is
240
not between "lying or constant, no-holds-barred truth-telling.
The difficulty comes in attempting to identify a way to choose among
these definitions in the context ofthe physician-patient relationship, which,
unlike many of the other contexts in which lying has been
analyzed-buyer/seller, police/arrestee-is a special relationship of a
fiduciary nature. Looking to the law that governs the physician-patient
relationship suggests two obvious starting places for choosing among the
definitions. First, we might select from the perspective of the reasonable
patient-what is the foundation of the patient's relationship with her
physician? 24' One appeal ofthis is that it enables the analysis to occur "from
the perspective of the deceived. 242 As it turns out, however, this approach
does not bring us to ready conclusions. As shall be discussed shortly, it is
not at all clear that most patients expect or desire a relationship built upon
absolute truth-telling at every turn.243 Patients sometimes seek perpetuation

236. Id.

237. Id.
238. Mary Mothersill, Some QuestionsAbout Truthfulness andLying,63 Soc. RES. 913,922

(1996).
239. Id. at 922.
240. BOK, supra note 189, at xxiii.
241. This might be analogized to the "rules of the game" analysis used by some to indicate
that there are certain contexts when it is understood that the participants will lie, e.g., poker, and
that the situation is fair, because either participant can exit at any time.
242. BOK, supra note 189, at 20-21.
243. See Alycia C. Regan, Regulating the Business of Medicine: Models for Integrating
Ethics andManagedCare, 30 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 635,648 (1997) (stating that "'[t]ruth
-telling' generally requires physicians to be honest with their patients, but the scope of the

principle remains uncertain").
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of self-deception. 44 It could very well be, then, that most patients would
elect the narrowest definition of lying, so that their physicians have plenty
of room to hedge, in case the patient does not seem interested in receiving
too much or too accurate information.
Problematically, a significant minority of patients could have views
about physicians lying to them that diverge sharply from the majority that
comprises the "reasonable patient."245 This raises serious questions about
relying upon the "reasonable patient" perspective as a baseline from which
ethics should operate. Ultimately, we have no way of knowing what
definition of lying a reasonable or any patient would choose, and cannot
reliably use this mechanism to resolve the ethical dilemma.
A second way of selecting the appropriate definition of lying would be
to rely upon what physicians do or believe they should do. This approach,
adopted by halfthe jurisdictions in establishing the standards of disclosure
for informed consent, looks to what physicians, according to their
professional judgment, would ordinarily disclose under the circumstances.246 In essence, custom, as defined by physicians, would determine
which definition of lying should apply to the physician-patient relationship.
Surely, there is something amiss in relying upon the liar's perspective to
determine what constitutes a lie. As observed by Professor Wetlaufer, the
argument that "relies entirely upon the claim that custom is the full measure
of ethics that is impoverished and
of ethics, [is] an understanding
' 47
unacceptably narrow.

,1

The most appealing alternative from an ethical, if not from a legal,248
perspective is the individual patient's view about lying in the particular
circumstances of the relationship with her physician or state ofmind when
confronting a specific medical crisis. Subsequent discussion will suggest

244. See infra notes 263-66 and accompanying text.
245. This objection arises in the informed consent context as well, with some arguing that
individualized informed consent is not achieved for the patient whose personal values, beliefs and
goals diverge from those of the "typical" patient, even under the reasonable patient standard of
informed consent. See JESSICA BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT 50 (2001).
246. Id. at 46; 61 AM. JUR. 2d Physicians,Surgeons, and Other Healers § 188 (1981). "The
traditional view or views, apparently still in effect in most jurisdictions, are that the duty is
measured by a professional medical standard: either the customary disclosure practices of
physicians or what a reasonable physician would disclose under the same or similar
circumstances." Id.; Laurent B. Frantz, Annotation, Modern Status of Views as to General
Measure of Physician'sDuty to Inform Patient of Risks of Proposed Treatment, 88 A.L.R.3d
1020, § 2(a) (1978).
247. Wetlaufer, supra note 211, at 1249.
248. A minority of courts have adopted a subjective patient-oriented standard for determining
what disclosures physicians must make to their patients under the doctrine of informed consent,
which requires physicians to disclose what the specific patient would want to know. BERG ETAL.,
supranote 245, at 50. This standard has been rejected by the overwhelming majority of courts
because it makes it too difficult for physicians to determine their legal obligations. Id.
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various ways physicians might determine whether patients want a
relationship founded upon a robust conception of disclosure in informed
consent. Unquestionably, significant problems inhere in this approach. It
establishes no firm parameters for physicians in defining their obligations to
patients, thereby introducing a high level ofunpredictability and uncertainty
into the physician-patient relationship and physicians' potential legal
liability. Such an approach can fairly be said to require physicians to read
their patients' minds. However, many human relationships require
extraordinary effort at attempting to understand the other party's desires:
spouses frequently and accurately observe that they are expected to read
their partners' minds, and while there is a world of difference between such
an intimate relationship and others, the need for empathy in many
professional relationships may not be so far from "mind-reading" of this
sort.
Ultimately, it becomes unnecessary to commit to a specific definition of
lying. In some instances, the choice may not even make a difference. In
others, the answer should depend upon what the patient seems to want. To
determine whether the choice of definition even matters, this section
analyzes the ethical dilemmas of using therapeutic placebos under the
alternative definitions of lying. The next section then explores whether
patients sometimes want to be "lied to," regardless ofthe definitions under
which we are working.
Beginning with examples drawn from the meaning model, patients are
said to respond more effectively when physicians convey confidence in a
speedy recovery, even if they are not sure what ails the patient. This raises
the question of whether it is appropriate, legally and ethically, for a
physician to convey confidence in his knowledge ofthe patient's condition,
if such confidence is really limited to the belief that the patient will get
better soon.249 In short, the question is whether the principle oftruth-telling
requires a physician to volunteer that he has no idea what is wrong with his
patient,"' when the patient suffers from a minor ailment which will resolve
itself, and when, according to placebo research, such disclosure could
retard recovery.
The physician in this scenario is behaving ethically according to Bok,
who requires an intent to mislead, and a false statement.25' The physician
is truly confident of the patient's speedy recovery, and as long as she does
not affirmatively state that the patient has a specific condition, the physician
avoids lying. A vague reference to a "bug," to employ Mary Mothersill's

249. Obviously, the analysis is easier if the patient does not press with a question so specific
that an unequivocal answer is unavoidable, and the physician feels certain that the patient is not

suffering from anything serious or threatening.
250. See supranote 230 and accompanying text.
251. See supranotes 230-34 and accompanying text.
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"equivocation" approach, would suffice.25 2 Further, the physician has not
created in the patient a "belief at variance with his own" because the
physician is confident in a speedy recovery; thus, he averts lying under
Wetlaufer's definition. 3
Ekman's definition demands that things should not be concealed if the
patient expects disclosure. 4 So when the patient is satisfied with the news
that he has a bug, and will be better in a few days, it is reasonable for the
physician to conclude that the patient expects no further information; there
is neither a lie nor a deception. If, however, the patient seeks more
definitive information about what is wrong with her, and seeks assurances
that the doctor is confident in his diagnosis, the physician risks deception,
because he is no longer attempting to represent confidence in speedy
recovery, but is being asked to convey confidence in his diagnosis, which
the physician does not have. Likewise, under any of these scenarios, if the
physician is indeed doubtful about the diagnosis, or that the patient will
recover in short order, she is lying to her patient when she projects
confidence.
Some respond that physicians can preserve the placebo effect and the
truth by simply telling the truth255 in a less "in your face" way.2 56 Thus, the
physician offering a patient an herb with no known therapeutic benefit
beyond the placebo effect might say, "Studies haven't proven this to be
effective, but I know a lot of patients find it helpful." The physician has
made no false assertions, but has left unsaid that if the herb helps, it is a
result of the placebo effect, rather than as a result of the active ingredients
in the herb. The question becomes, then, whether this formulation
sufficiently avoids the prohibition against lying. Some would say no:
knowing that the patient infers that the herb contains some ingredient that
will help her, the physician has deceived the patient by specifically
withholding that he is recommending the herb as a placebo, albeit to avoid
undermining its effectiveness.
Relevant research also suggests that informing patients of potential
adverse side-effects of prescription drugs increases the probability of the
patient experiencing those side effects.257 Currently, the doctrine of

252. See supra notes 238-239 and accompanying text.
253. See Wetlaufer, supra note 211, at 1223.
254. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
255. This Article does not explore the suggestion that physicians are not engaging in
deception, but rather in a form of psychotherapy. See generallyAlan Leslie, Ethics and Practice
of Placebo Therapy, 79 AM. J. MED. 854, 855 (1954).
256. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 37, at 339 (noting that some physicians accompany the
administration of placebos to their patients by using "duplicitous language carefully couched to
disclaim and endorse the artifice simultaneously").
257. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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informed consent,258 as well as federal drug regulations,"' compel
disclosure of potential adverse consequences of the proffered treatment.260
Avoidance ofnocebo effects would commend withholding this information.
This scenario does not involve lying-there is no false statement, and no

258. The "informed consent doctrine" provides that the consent necessary to constitute
effective authority for medical treatment only arises from the patient's understanding of the
various alternatives to and risks of treatment. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 n.l 5 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied,409 U.S. 1064 (1972); see, e.g., Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to
Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 628, 629 (1970). Generally physicians have a "duty to warn of the
dangers lurking in the proposed treatment." Canterbury,464 F.2d at 782. Due care normally
requires that the physician warn the patient of the risks to his well-being which may result from
the proposed medical treatment. Id. Informed consent forms frequently list possible side effects
of the therapy. See also Plumber v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 634 So. 2d. 1347 (La. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff gave informed consent for chemotherapy treatments when she
signed an informed consent form listing potential side effects and received explanations from her
physician specifically addressing possible complications). In New Jersey, informed consent
provisions have been statutorily prescribed to include
as a minimum the specific procedure or treatment, the medically significant risks
involved, and the possible duration of incapacitation, if any, as well as an
explanation of the significance of the patient's informed consent. The patient
shall be advised of any medically significant alternatives for care or treatment,
however, this does not include experimental treatments that are not yet accepted
by the medical establishment.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.8 (d) (2000).
259. Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 352, Misbranded Drugs and Devices, prescription drug
advertisements and other printed material included with the drug shall include the following:
established name; quantitative formula; side effects, contraindications, and
effectiveness; prior approval; false advertising; labeling; construction of the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances.
21 U.S.C. § 352 (2001).
260. Courts have recognized two exceptions to the general duty of disclosure. The first
exception is triggered "when the patient is unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting, and
harm from a failure to treat is imminent and outweighs any harm threatened by the proposed
treatment." Canterbury,464 F.2d at 788. In the case of an emergency, conferring with the patient
about the treatment is impractical and as such the physician should proceed with treatment if time
does not allow for discussion. Id. at 789 (citing Dunham v. Wright, 423 F.2d 940, 941-42 (3d Cir.
1970); Koury v. Folio, 158 S.E.2d. 548, 555 (1968); Woods v. Brumlop, 377 P.2d 520, 525
(1962); Gravis v. Physicians & Surgeons Hosp., 415 S.W.2d. 674, 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)).
The second exception is available when disclosing the risks to the patient would be detrimental
to the patient to such a degree that the information would "foreclose a rational decision, or
complicate or hinder the treatment, or perhaps even pose psychological damage to the patient."
Id. (citing Salgo v. Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (1967)); Waltz
& Scheuneman, supra note 258, at 641-43. Under such circumstance, courts have generally held
that the physician has a privilege to withhold the information from the patient for therapeutic
reasons. Id.
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intent to mislead. As long as the physician truthfully represents his belief
that the patient is better with the treatment than without, he does not run
afoul of Wetlaufer's construction of a lie, either. Of course, there may be
legal or other ethical problems with nondisclosure of potential adverse side
effects.
The final nondisclosure scenario involves the stroke patient with a
useless arm and lame leg, who desperately wants to hear that he will fully
recover his physical functioning, but whom the physician knows (believes?)
will not be able to regain much functioning in his arm. The treating
physician describes her approach this way:
I knew when I met Mr. Burton that he would very unlikely
recover significant use of his arm. Trained in the era of patient
autonomy, I once felt I should share all available information
I could provide about prognosis as early as possible. Arguably,
unfavorable news regarding arm recovery would be tempered
by favorable predictions of a return to walking and living
independently .... When good news is delivered with bad
news, the good news often is submerged beneath the bad. It
quickly became apparent to me that most of my patients were
not ready for the cold hard facts the minute they arrived at the
rehabilitation hospital. They needed time to come to terms
with the reality of their disabilities, while simultaneously
regaining lost function. This is a process that shouldn't be
rushed.
Patients with severe illnesses are looking for a mix of hope
and reality, and providing either one alone is a disservice.
Hope is a fragile commodity, easily crushed by careless
provision of the "facts." There is a fine line between
paternalistic withholding of the truth and leaving some
imprecision regarding prognosis in order to maintain hope. In
our zeal for patient autonomy, we should not forget the
importance of nurturing that hope. 6'
Bok's condemnation of lying does not compel revelation of the
complete truth. Thus. the rehab doctor can conceal her doubts about the
patient's recovery of her arm. without lying. Once we revert to the more
broad definitions of lying, a physician will naturally fall upon the defense
that the answers to the stroke patient's questions can never be certain; that
she seeks to provide the best scenario. which is on the spectrum of truth;
or that she is simply rendering an opinion, which cannot be objectively
judged.

261. Stein. sipra note 199.
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Wetlaufer has anticipated these defenses, of course, by focusing not on
the truth or falsity of the statement, but on whether the statement deviates
from the speaker's own beliefs. Thus, as conceived by Wetlaufer, the
physician would be compelled to forthrightly respond to the patient's
questions, lest she be lying. Not yet considered, however, is whether
eliciting the placebo effect, by preserving hope, would justify or excuse the
physician's lie.
Some placebo scenarios may require actual deceit, as opposed to mere
non-disclosure. Conditioning theorists anticipate capitalizing on the placebo
effect by interspersing active drugs with placebos. Assuming that the
physician has not revealed her plan, this deception can be analyzed in
multiple ways. First, it can be said that the physician has represented to the
patient, either actually or by reasonable inference, that each time she takes
a pill, or pushes a button, she is receiving a drug that will relieve her pain.262
There would seem to be no question that the physician intends to deceive
the patient; the physician's statement or inference constitutes a falsification
or concealment under any of the definitions available.
But is it really so clear cut? An equally valid rendition of the interaction
between physician and patient is that the physician explained that the patient
will receive a treatment regime designed to reduce pain, with the fewest
side effects. There is no false statement since the drug/placebo combination
comports precisely with the physician's representation. If the placebo
works, it will have the same effect as the drug and will deliver pain relief,
which is what the patient was promised. That is, it will have a specific effect
on the patient, due to patient conditioning, even absent the presence of any
active ingredients in the placebo. Arguably, most patients would be happy
to have been relieved of the pain and to have experienced fewer side
effects, even if their relief was the result of deception.
b. When Lying Is Not Lying
This part makes two arguments: one ethical, and one legal. First, in
many instances, patients want to be lied to, and physicians generally realize
this, and should pursue the humane course of fulfilling their patients'
desires. Many such lies will enable patients to maintain hope, or elicit the
placebo effect. In essence, the patient desires to be deceived. That the
deception is consented to, even if implicitly, renders it ethical. Of course,
patients may explicitly consent to be deceived, but this solution is
impracticable. The legal argument is that patient deception in the placebo

262. Leslie suggests that a misrepresentation occurs because "the patient is led to believe that
he has been given a substance of inherent therapeutic value." Leslie, supra note 255, at 855. Once
we understand the mechanisms of the placebo effect, it might very well be that placebos satisfy
this criteria, thereby averting entirely the question of deception.
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context is consistent with the doctrine of informed consent, whether
analyzed according to the professional standard or the patient-oriented
standard. Further, if a physician appropriately provides a therapeutic
placebo to his patient, he is not engaging in fraud, because he is presenting
something that does have the potential to benefit the patient.
3. Patients Implicitly Consent to Physician Deception
Years of bioethical literature heralding the primacy of patient selfdetermination and autonomy263 lay the foundation for the concept that
physicians must fully disclose to patients their condition, and their treatment
options, or that they are going to die. Interestingly, four decades later,
studies have found that many physicians persist in practices of partial
disclosures to their patients, 26 thereby facing the disapprobation of
bioethicists. Not usually addressed by this vast body of ethical and legal
analysis, and empirical studies, is how the physician should respond to the
patient whom she believes either wants to be deceived or seeks
connivance... in self-deception."'

263. See generally TOM L. BEACHAMP & LEROY WALTERS, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN
BIOETHICS (1999); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984).

264. See Eric J. Cassell, The Principles of the Belmont Report Revisited, 30 HASTINGS
CENTER. REP. 12 (July 2000) (explaining that until the 1970s, physicians often failed to disclose
the truth to patients with life-threatening diseases); Denise A. Dickerson, A Doctor's Duty to
Disclose Life Expectancy Information to Terminally ll Patients,43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319, 321
(1995) (commenting that "[h]ealth care professionals are sometimes reluctant to disclose
diagnoses and prognoses to dying patients").
265. J.A. Barnes suggests that the term connivance is more accurate than the term collusion.
Dupes who connive at the deceit may pretend to remain deceived but this is only
apretence. The dupe becomes an unacknowledged partner with the liar in afolie
a deux. Here we should make a distinction between conscious and unconscious
connivance, between recognition that one is being targeted as an intended dupe
and an unconscious accommodation to this situation.
BARNES, supra note 224, at 94.

If the liar realizes that the lie has been detected and joins the dupe in the
pretence that it has not, we have mutual connivance; both parties shut their eyes
to the deceit attempted by the other. If their mutual connivance is more or less
openly acknowledged by both parties, neither party is deceived; they join in a
pretence. If they start to treat the pretence as authentic, they become selfdeluded.
Id. at 97.
266. In some cases, it may be that the term self-delusion is more apt, but self-deception
suffices for purposes of this discussion. J.A. Barnes explains the distinction, employing the term
"sell-deception" to refer
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None of us can deny that these patients and moments exist,2 67 because
most of us have been one of those patients, or, at one time or another, have
sought to preserve our self-imposed disconnect from reality, whether268to
cope "with fear,.. . to tolerate stress, (or) to gain a sense of control.
Paul Ekman suggests that people sometimes want to be misled, and
therefore "collude unwittingly because [they] have a stake in not knowing
the truth. 269 Other times, we simply choose "to not know what we
know. ' 2 7' Thus, it has been suggested that physicians, in particular, should
frame the information that they provide to their patients in response to what
the patients signal they want to hear:
What is wanted is co-conspiracy; the patient needs to be
able to work out an appropriate schema for understanding and
dealing with the unpleasantness she or he faces, and it is hard
to say anything very definite about what this will be like in the
abstract. It certainly means that there will be well-told lies told
in the interest of a larger truth.27
In many instances, that larger truth is optimism.2' Nyberg observes:
"[p]hysically ill patients can contribute significantly to their own recovery
by maintaining apossibly unrealistic optimism about, or a sense ofpersonal
control over, their own wellness and the future."'273 This, Nyberg observes,
is the placebo effect.274
What the various ethical theories fail to account for then, but which
doctors surely face in their daily practice, is the self-deceiving patient:

to the process whereby there is an inner dialogue in which one segment of a
personality deceives another segment, and where the lying segment remains
aware of the deceit. Self-delusion seems an appropriate label for the state of
affairs reached when a liar begins to believe that his or her lie is not a lie at all
but is true.

Id. at 89.
267. Professor Fried might disagree: "much ofthe peculiarity about lying to oneself consists
in the fact that it seems not so much bad as downright self-contradictory, logically
impossible ..... FRIED, supra note 189, at 66.
268. DAVIDNYBERG, THE VARNsHED TRUTH 1 (1993).
269. Ekman, supra note 225, at 812.
270. Lore Segal, My Grandfather'sWalking Stick or The Pink Lie, 63 Soc. REs. 931, 935
(1996).
271. Alan Ryan, ProfessionalLiars,63 Soc.REs. 619,627 (1996). Nyberg observes asimilar
phenomenon: "when the truth we know is either insufficient or unpleasant or both, distortion is
sometimes needed to maintain coherence and stability." NYBERG, supra note 268, at 99.
272. NYBERG, supranote 268, at 105.
273. Id. at 106.
274. Id at 106-07.
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[W]hen we believe, or at least strongly suspect, something to
be true and yet turn away from it, disbelieve it on purpose, in
order to evade the consequences of facing it-then we are
deceiving ourselves. When we declare one belief for the
purpose of denying another that we take to be true-that is
self-deception ....Self-deception is skillful maneuvering to
achieve ignorance when clear, conscious understanding
threatens to break through.275
The question, then, is whether the physician treating the terminally ill
patient who insists on using a CAM modality that she believes is totally
useless, but which may indeed be providing some placebo relief, and which
the patient believes is extending her life, may suggest that the physician,
too, believes that the CAM treatment is keeping her alive. If the patient
knows in her heart that the CAM intervention does not work, and knows
that the physician does not think so either, such a statement would not
count as a lie.276 What we certainly have is connivance in the patient's selfdeception.
This scenario is one in which the patient implicitly consents to being
deceived by her physician. Physicians should, in appropriate circumstances,
honor the wishes of the patient who seeks to be deceived. The key is
whether society is willing to trust physicians to use deception in their
relationships with their patients "thoughtfully and judiciously, charitably,
' The first challenge, of course, is whether
humanely and with discretion."277
physicians are able to correctly "divine" which patients are "implicitly
consenting" to a deceptive relationship. 78 Presumably, the physician must
also guess the extent to which the patient desires to engage in deception.
Further, the contention that deceit ofa patient is occasionally justified rests
entirely on a presumption that the patient will derive some benefit, whether
psychic, emotional or physical, from the deceit, and that this benefit, from
the patient's perspective, outweighs any downsides. It is doubtful that
physicians have the tools to either identify, measure, or weigh such benefits
to be sure that they are making the right decision.
Conceptions of informed consent, whether ethical or legal, should allow
for those instances and patients who want to be deceived, or for whom the
truth would be therapeutically counterproductive. Hope feeds the placebo
effect. Hope that shark cartilage will cure the lung cancer that conventional

275. Id. at 90-91.
276. Professor Fried would call this an "attempted lie." FRIED, supra note 189, at 59.
277. NYBERG, supranote 268, at 61-62.
278. Nyberg observes: "We can never know for sure what is in other people's minds, and it
is presumptuous to assume to know what other people 'really' need." Id. at 139.
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medicine cannot;279 hope that massage therapy will resolve infertility; hope
that physical therapy will restore use of the arm disabled by a stroke.
Physicians who provide care at the end of life have long struggled with the
questions of whether they may perpetuate untruths to preserve hope;
Whether hope plays a positive role in patient care; or whether the unrealistic
perpetuation of hope is cruel or otherwise harmful.
Doctors tell us that hope assists the process of healing.
Perhaps our very instincts lose courage where we stop
hoping .... Hope's necessary falsehoods are the tools in our
survival kit and blessedly preserve us from intellectual despair,
the sin accounted as the seventh and deadliest because it
demonstrates an absence of Faith.
Hope's rose-coloredi falsehoods function to deceive ourselves
and to participate in the deceptions practiced by our
community. Hope ignores the evidence of history and
experience; it lies in face of its better knowledge in order to
con us out
of knowing what we know and into thinking what
2 80
we wish.
And so, law and ethics should recognize that patients may explicitly and,
sometimes implicitly, consent to be deceived.
4. Patient Deception Is Consistent with
Informed Consent and Fraud
This part presents three legal arguments: first, that a patient may
consent to being lied to, thereby negating any legal problems; second, that
patient deception to facilitate a therapeutic placebo does not deviate from
the legal standard of informed consent; and, finally, that physicians' use of
placebos does not constitute fraud.
One may consent to being lied to.28 When a patient consents to being
uninformed, or misled, the physician does nothing legally or ethically wrong

279. NCCAM Research Progress Update: A Report for Fiscal Year 2000, at
http://nccam.nih.gov/abouttplans/researchprogressindex/htm. NCCAM's cancer research portfolio
includes studies involving shark cartilage co-funded with the NCI. Id. "These studies include an
ongoing Phase III clinical trial involving over 700 lung cancer patients in the United States and
Canada. A second trial will examine safety and efficacy of shark cartilage in patients with a
variety of advanced cancers." Id.
280. Segal, supra note 270, at 932.
281. See generally Strudler, supra note 190, at 1553-55. Bok would say that the physician
has an excuse to lie, and that it is fair under the circumstances, because the patient has "agreed
in advance to a practice involving deception. They have set rules for what is fair, for what can be
expected." BOK, supra note 189, at 83.
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by lying.282 Professor Marshall Kapp proposes a "patient-mediated
interaction model [that] presents a framework for a disclosure process that
can maximize the patient's opportunity for exercising judgment by giving
the patient affirmative control over the scope of information shared or
withheld."283 Kapp anticipates a scenario in which the physician and patient
would negotiate the terms of their relationship, and the conditions under
which the physician may conceal information about placebo use, 284 or
presumably, mislead the patient about her treatment for purposes of
eliciting the placebo effect. In this way, Kapp argues, the physician can
achieve voluntary and knowing relinquishment by the patient of her
decisionmaking
prerogatives, to enable the physician to employ placebo
285
therapy.
An earlier example involving conditioning illustrates this approach.
When a physician contemplates alternating between an analgesic and
placebo, she could, at the commencement of treatment, advise the patient
of the precise plan, and that the placebo will have the same effect as the
drug. The unanswered question is whether revelation of this information
will reduce the placebo effect to a negligible degree.286 Possibly more
important is whether such an approach will undermine not only the placebo
effect, but the specific effect of the analgesic as well. The outlines of
Kapp's proposal are broad. It remains unclear whether the negotiated
agreement would occur when one becomes a particular physician's patient;
it might occur at the beginning of a particular treatment regime, or upon
diagnosis ofa particular condition. While this negotiated arrangement might
make sense in a physician-patient relationship that is long-standing, with a
strong interpersonal foundation, fewer such relationships exist in a world
of managed care. Further, when patients are seriously ill, they are frequently
shuttled from one specialist to the next, and it is unlikely that physicians
could comfortably negotiate with a short-term patient in crisis the kind of
delegated authority this scenario contemplates. Further, while Kapp states
that he expects that most of the "deals" between physician and patient to
be explicit, he7also leaves open the possibility that the "specifications" could
28
be implicit.
A scenario involving implicit consent to the provision of aplacebo must
comport with the doctrine of informed consent to be of practical value to
physicians. Assuming that the physician appropriately selects a therapeutic
placebo for a given patient, he does not violate the legal duty to obtain the

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See Ryan, supra note 271, at 1555.
Kapp, supra note 189, at 404.
Id.
Id.
See Brody, supranote 188, at 117.
Kapp, supra note 189, at 404.
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patient's consent, irrespective of whether the relevant jurisdiction adheres
to the professional or patient-oriented standard of informed consent. The
legal doctrine of informed consent, which seeks to ensure the patient's
exercise of her autonomy in medical decision-making, requires physicians
to disclose the patient's diagnosis, the proposed treatment options, and
risks and benefits of each alternative.288 Two standards have evolved to
guide physicians in determining precisely what information, especially with
respect to risk, they must disclose to patients. The professional standard of
informed consent requires physicians to make those disclosures which a
reasonable physician would make under the circumstances.2 89 The patientoriented standard requires physicians to provide patients with that
information which the "reasonably prudent person would find material to
making a decision.""
If physicians begin to prescribe placebos for therapeutic purposes,
without disclosing their true nature to patients, the professional standard
among physicians will evolve into one of non-disclosure. That is, if
physicians typically decline to reveal to patients that they are receiving a
placebo, then they will create a professional standard ofnondisclosure such
that none of them would be deviating from the requirements of the doctrine
of informed consent.
Neither will physicians encounter legal hurdles under a patient-oriented
standard. If, as earlier argued, the reasonable patient would opt to
experience the benefits of placebo therapy without having the truth revealed
to her, then the legal standard of disclosure, as determined by the
reasonable patient, would not compel the physician to advise the patient
that she is receiving a placebo.
If informed consent is not aproblem, we must consider fraud. Returning
to the meaning model, presumably, patients can ascribe meaning to almost
any ritual, which can range from harmful to useless. When otherwise
useless modalities are used with a physician's complicity or are provided or
recommended by a physician, are there limits as to what a licensed
physician can do, and might the physicians' behavior, even if done for
symbolic import, become fraudulent?291 Going along with a patient's belief
in a folk remedy with no specific effect may be fairly characterized as
benignly dishonest. It could be more harmful if patients attribute a resultant
cure to the folk remedy rather than the conventional treatment. Beyond
this, however, physicians could arguably integrate meaningless routines or

288. See BERG ET AL., supra note 245, at 46.
289. See id.
290. See id at 49.
291. See Kapp, supra note 189, at 387-90 (stating that a survey of limited case law is not
particularly supportive of fraud cause of action in placebo context and a third party payor charged
for placebos may have greater chance of recovery).
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treatments into their practices on the theory that they are seeking to achieve
the placebo effect. Since they will undoubtedly be charging for these
ministrations; is it possible to distinguish between "legitimate" employment
of the placebo effect, and consumer fraud?
Jurcichv. GeneralMotorsCorp.,292 the only relevant case, suggests that
in the proper circumstances, the prescription ofplacebos may be medically
appropriate.293 The Missouri appellate court determined that a suit
contesting the provision of placebos to plaintiff for his pain sounded in
malpractice, rather than fraud.294 Jurcich involved a situation in which a
nurse employed by a company infirmary repeatedly administered placebo
pills to an injured employee, rather than the pain pills he requested and
believed he was receiving.295 In rejecting plaintiff's claim for deceit, the
Missouri court observed that the prescription ofplacebos "is, in appropriate
' The court also accepted
cases, a recognized form of medical treatment."296
the expert's testimony that a physician would not advise
the patient he is
29 7
receiving a placebo, because then it would not work.
The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA) states that
representing to a consumer that "the subject of a ...transaction" has
"performance characteristics ... uses, or benefits it does not have" is
deceptive.298 It is unpredictable how this would apply where a physician
argues that the placebo, when effective, can elicit positive outcomes in a
patient. Under the UCSPA, can a pure placebo be represented to a patient
as possessing curative or ameliorative characteristics without the
representation being considered deceptive?299
292. 539 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
293. Id. at 602.
294. Id. at 600.
295. Id. at 598. It was not until plaintiff received his medical records in connection with his
Workers' Compensation claim that he learned the truth. Id. at 599.
296. Id. at 600.
297. Id.
298. Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, 1970 Act § 3(b)(1). The Act has been held to
apply to claims against physicians for breach of express warranties or misrepresentations where
a physician has guaranteed a particular result. See, e.g., Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239,
242-43 (Tex. 1994) (breast augmentation); Smith v. Elliott, 68 S.W.3d 844,846 (Tex. App. 2002)
(breast reduction). The act does not require proof of intent to deceive. Riley v. Enter. Furniture
Co., 375 N.E.2d 821, 823 (1977).
299. Marshall Kapp concludes that a physician who administers placebo therapy to a patient
would satisfy the common law elements of fraud:
(1) a statement, a guilty silence, or a concealment by the defendant of a
fact...;
(2) the inaccuracy ofthe statement or of the impression created by the silence
or concealment;
(3) the objective materiality of the fact to the plaintiffs decision;
(4) an actual subjective reliance by the plaintiff on the statement or
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If placebos work, the Jurcich case seems to have gotten the analysis
right, and should dictate the outcome under the UCSPA as well. Physicians
are not engaging in fraud if they provide placebos to patients while
representing that they will provide relief. The real question should be, as the
Jurcich court notes, whether the circumstances for the physicians'
administration of the placebo were appropriate-the question is one of
malpractice, not fraud.
Concerns may remain about physicians' therapeutic employment of
placebos that should not escape regulatory attention. Provision ofplacebos
might become a source of easy additional revenue to physicians, at a cost
to both patients and the health care system. Even in those instances when
the physician appropriately prescribes an (inert) placebo, ethical guidance
would be helpful in aiding physicians in determining appropriate price
schemes. Placebos could also present a harm to patients who share their
medications. Presumably, the placebo effect might also aid the second-hand
recipient, but where the placebo effect is the result of conditioning, for
example, it would provide no benefit, and conceivably result in delayed
treatment for someone at risk.
C. Justifying Lying to Achieve the PlaceboEffect
Some will reject the notion of consent to deception, especially implicit
consent, preferring perhaps the traditional analytical approach outlined by
Bok, which requires an excuse or moral justification for lying. The category
of excuse most relevant to this analysis is one where "the liar admits the lie,
accepts responsibility for it, but offers reasons to show that he should be
partially or even wholly cleared of blame."300 This excuse "offers moral
reasons for a lie, reasons to show that a lie ought, under the circumstances,
to be allowed." '' In the placebo context, the principle that might possibly
excuse the physician who lies to her patient is "that the lie was told in an
attempt to achieve an overriding benefit."3 2 That the benefit sought to be
achieved is for the patient makes the excuse more appealing than it
impression;
(5) the defendant's knowledge of the falsity of the statement or impression
(or reckless or negligent disregard of falsity);
(6) an intent by the defendant to produce reliance and to induce action by the
plaintiff;
(7) a loss suffered by the plaintiff; and

(8) causation-in-fact of the loss by the induced action or inaction.
Kapp, supra note 189, at 387 (quoting Halligan, The Standardof Disclosure by Physicians to
Patients: CompetingModels of Informed Consent,41 LA. L. REv. 9, 26 (1980)).

300.

BOK,

supra note 189, at 75.

301. Id.
302. Id. at 76.
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otherwise might be had the benefit been for society generally, or for the
physician himself. If the lie does not benefit the physician, say, by letting
him avoid an emotionally difficult conversation with his patient, the claim
of excuse appears unsuspicious.
In the alternative, however, the physician may claim that she isjustified
in deceiving the patient in order to achieve the placebo effect. To claim
justification, the physician is defending "as just, right, or proper, by
providing adequate reasons," that she lied to her patient." 3 The physician's
claim to moral justification must be publicly defensible-in this instance,
presumably, physicians, as a profession, would have to convince us that
there are instances in which they may morally deceive us, to achieve the
benefits of the placebo effect. Physicians arejustified in engaging in patient
deceit in administering placebos if the idea survives this public vetting."
Anticipating the objection that public revelation will undermine the
effectiveness of the lie in the individual case, Bok responds that "[i]t would
certainly be self-defeating to preface any one lie by consultation with the
dupe. But it is not at all self-defeating to discuss deceptive policies
beforehand, nor to warn the deceived themselves."305 Furthermore,
according to Bok, before the individual physician can be assured that her
deception of her patient is justified, she must ensure that no alternatives of
a non-deceptive nature exist." 6 So, in the instance of placebo
administration, the physician would have to decide that obtaining patient
consent to be lied to, as proposed by Marshall Kapp," 7 is not feasible under
the circumstances. Further, the physician must believe that no non-placebo
alternative can accomplish what she expects the placebo to produce. It
could also be that the physician fairly believes that the patient will be
satisfied with nothing less than placebo administration-that integrating
aroma ther'apy with essential conventional medicine is the only treatment
plan upon which physician and patient can agree-which mightjustify the
physician's endorsing the patient's choice even though the physician thinks
that the CAM selection is bunk.
D. The Harms ofLying to Patients
The difficulty in this entire discussion derives primarily from our
insufficient understanding of the placebo effect. Medically, even if the
placebo effect is real, physicians are not sure on whom placebos will work,
or what the strength of the placebo effect will be. Ethically and legally, it
cannot be predicted which patients will agree that the benefits achieved
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

Id. at 91.
See id. at 94-98.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 103.
See Kapp, supra note 189, at 404.
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from placebos are worth the cost to autonomy-lying, withholding
information, denying choice about one's medical care. Even worse, the
patient who learns that she has been deceived may lose faith in her
physician, and perhaps all physicians. This cost would be huge, and can
neither be predicted nor underestimated. We have already experienced a
medical model founded upon paternalism and rejected it. The question then
becomes whether physicians can be sufficiently disciplined to deceive their
patients sparingly, such that the trust that is essential to the physicianpatient relationship remains intact.
Every consideration of lying focuses on the harms that lying inevitably
causes to the one lied to, to the liar, to the system of which the liar is a part,
and to the community as a whole. The philosophical objection to lying is
that it is a form of coercion.0 8 It ostensibly removes from the patient her
ability to direct her own care, based upon complete information about her
condition and the recommended treatment. Instead, the physician lies, and
relegates to herself the power to decide the patient's medical future.
Further, a misrepresentation about the patient's alternatives may distort the
decisionmaking process, by, for example, confusing the weights to be
accorded the various treatments' probabilities of success. A physician who
allows a patient to choose an alternative modality, over conventional
therapy, based solely on the physician's confidence in producing a placebo
effect, obscures the patient's understanding of her choice-between a
hoped for placebo effect and a treatment with known efficacy. Similarly, a
patient may believe she has a real choice that does not really exist, if the
alternative to the placebo is clearly superior.30 9
However, these arguments overstate the frequency with which
therapeutic placebos will be appropriate choices, as well as the frequency
with which deception will be necessary to effectively administer placebo
therapy. As discussed earlier, the assumption that lying is necessary to
placebo treatment is simply not true. Whether due to the kind of placebo
being employed (rituals), or because of more careful analysis of what
constitutes deception, often neither lying nor deception is necessary to
evoke the placebo effect.
Nonetheless, there will be instances in which lying will, admittedly, be
necessary. Most of these times, conventional options will have already
failed, should no longer be relied upon exclusively, or will not exist. At
these moments, therapeutic placebos should be taken seriously because they
might offer real benefit to patients, particularly those with pain, who have
exhausted the armamentarium of biomedicine, or for whom conventional
medicine's options are simply inadequate. The arguments weighing in favor

308. BOK, supranote 189, at 18.
309. See id. at 19-20 ("a lie may lead to the unnecessary loss of confidence in the best
alternative," or create a false certainty or uncertainty).
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of therapeutic placebos rest on a convincing assumption that most such
patients, if consulted, would choose relief, amelioration of side effects,
cure, or maybe even cost reduction, even at the cost of their autonomy.
The objections to therapeutic placebos enumerated above also fail to
acknowledge that with all therapies, whether specific or placebo,
effectiveness is about probabilities. Physicians attempt to glean as much
information about the specific patient, her condition, and her past treatment
efforts to make very educated guesses about which treatments offer the
highest probability of success. The patient is not choosing between
efficacious conventional medicine with certain relief and some hoped for
benefit of a placebo. The choice is between two therapeutic options, which,
considering potential for success, benefits, risks and side effects, are
reasonable alternatives for successful treatment of the patient's condition.
If placebo research bears out, physicians will not be engaging in some
nefarious enterprise, but will be giving a patient a choice between two real
therapies, with dramatically different mechanisms of operation.
Further, engaging in deception to evoke the placebo effect will
frequently comport with patient autonomy. For patients who fervently
believe in CAM and desperately want to hang on to their hopes for
rehabilitation, or simply believe that they will live longer than the statistics
foretell, compelling them to "deal with the cold hard facts" undermines their
autonomy, precisely because it is not what they choose to hear or know.
Neither the ethical conceptions of autonomy, nor the legal precepts of selfdetermination, compels patients to accept reality. Further, if extinguishing
hope is medically contraindicated because it will also destroy the effect of
an efficacious placebo, then physicians should stop ignoring this clinical
opportunity to help their patients.
Unresolved is the patient who deviates from what the "reasonable
patient" would choose-the patient who fears deception.3"' If it becomes
widely known that physicians lie to patients about placebos (even if only
sometimes), patients may come to believe that physicians lie in general,
undermining their confidence in physicians and leading to a diminution of
the physician's power in the patient's eyes. This would be ironic, since a
patient's confidence in her physician is an important contributing factor to
the placebo effect.3 ' Undoubtedly, there will be patients who will become
distrustful of physicians if they begin to use placebos. These patients could
protect themselves from receiving placebos by advising the physician at the
commencement of the doctor-patient relationship that the physician may

310. Thomas, supra note 37, at 345 (commenting that patients will tend to know the
circumstances under which doctors consider placebos effective and that knowledge will likely
anger the patient and may cause future doubt in medication that the patient is told will help).
311. One wonders whether this phenomenon might not occur, but that, like politicians,
patients would believe that while most physicians can't be trusted, their physician can.
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not, at any time or for any reason, use a placebo. 1 2 Again, the argument in
support ofplacebo usage, with those patients whom the physician believes
will not object, rests on an assumption that patients focus on the end
result-whether or not they have been helped, regardless of whether the
treatment involved placebo and deception. For chronically ill patients for
whom medicine has provided insufficient relief, the conjecture is that what
was involved will be irrelevant.
Physicians' judicious use of placebos, and even more conservative
reliance on patient deception, is essential to avoiding the very real danger
ofa "slippery slope"--that giving physicians permission to lie will signal to
physicians that they can lie in other contexts as well. It has been argued that
allowing police to lie to extract confessions has freed them to lie more
generally, undermining society's faith in their veracity overall.31 3 This is a
large risk to the medical profession. The prescription of placebos may be
harder to monitor than other medical treatment-if it occurs primarily in the
physician's office, it will not be subject to the systemic oversight that
occurs in hospitals; if physicians do not bill third party payors for placebos,
their prescribing patterns will not be monitored by the insurance companies;
because placebos are not regulated, their use will not be subject to the
checks of the laws governing prescriptions of controlled substances.
Because patients will be unaware that they are receiving placebos, the
physicians will never be subject to patient inquiry. In short, physicians are
likely to be subject to little accountability in their decisions to lie to their
patients in an effort to achieve the placebo effect.
Not only are lies harmful but so might placebos be harmful. Numerous
critics of placebos have recounted the several potential and serious harms
that could result from their use. Physicians who too readily rely upon
placebos, without spending sufficient time to ensure an accurate diagnosis,
may end up missing the patient's true diagnosis, 3 4 and the opportunity to
provide effective curative treatment. Physicians dealing with patients whom
they believe are psychosomatic frequently resort to placebos. This might
very well constitute mistreatment of undiagnosed patients. The short
answer to these concerns is that inappropriate use of placebos-deviation
from the standard ofcare-should be treated no differently than prescribing
the wrong drug, and should be addressed by tort law.
Almost all ofthe placebo discussion ofpotential harms assumes that the
placebo of choice will be some kind of medicine, or massage, or herb. Not
frequently discussed is placebo surgery, which has recently been used by

312. This is the reverse of Professor Kapp's proposal. I readily acknowledge that patients
who distrust physicians in the first instance will likely not find this solution to be very responsive

or comforting.
313. See Young, supra note 213, at 468-71.
314. See, e.g., BOK, supra note 189, at 63.
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researchers, and continues to be the subject of clinical study.315 It may well
be necessary to devise special rules for this situation, even if placebo
therapy in general becomes accepted. Placebo surgery that requires general
anesthesia potentially places patients at more risk than if they were
receiving a placebo by another medium, but whether this risk exceeds the
potential benefits would have to be determined on an individual basis. Any
invasive procedure presents risk of infection or cardiac arrest; a hospital
stay risks iatrogenic injury. The treating physician would have to be highly
confident in a substantial placebo effect, and lack reasonable alternatives,
to justify first, the sham surgery, and second, lying to a patient about the
surgery. The prospect of malpractice liability in such circumstances is surely
more serious than in other placebo contexts.
V. CONCLUSION

All of this is impossible to sort out until we have a sufficient
understanding of whether placebos work, and their mechanism. If the
Danish study is correct and there is no placebo effect, a radical
reconceptualization of much present practice would be required.
Conversely, assuming there is a placebo effect, and we can predict with a
reliable degree of certainty on whom placebos will work, they could offer
an extraordinarily potent addition to the tretments available to physicians.
The first analytical difficulty would seem to be getting beyond the point of
thinking of placebos as a sham, or as non-treatment. In the scenario where
they have been proven to be efficacious, they should be considered as a
specific treatment, just like a drug, or surgery. Physicians should then be
able to present them as an alternative treatment, with a quantifiable
probability of success, an expected magnitude ofpower, and potential side
effects.
If the placebo effect is proven to be as powerful as many researchers
believe, then it should be viewed as an effective treatment, legitimately used
by practitioners and patients, rather than a "dirty trick" that is
unprofessional, and beneath physicians. If the physician has a sufficient
degree of certainty that she will achieve a therapeutic placebo effect for the
patient, then the representation that the placebo is therapy or a medicine is
not untrue. Assuming that the placebo effect is achieved, the patient will
have received a therapeutically beneficial intervention, which was what she
was told she was receiving. Thus, no deceit.

315. See, e.g., Freeman et al., supra note 207, at 988. See also Alan G. Johnson, Surgery as
a Placebo,344 LANcET 1140 (1994); Ruth Macklin, The EthicalProblems with Sham Surgery in
ClinicalResearch, 341 NEw ENG. J. MED. 992 (1999).
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